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"We the People": John Locke,
Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge
Government Action
Donald L. Doernberg?
The first three words of the preamble to the Constitution1 suggest
one element unique to the American Revolution: its outcome was a government created by the people, not one existing independently of them
or, in some respect, over them.2 Indeed, the preamble reads like a charge
to the new government, as though the Framers had said "this is what
you, the government, shall do," and then in the Constitution said "and
here is how you shall accomplish it." The idea of popular sovereignty in
the United States antedates the Constitution, appearing in its best known
form in the Declaration of Independence's admonition that governments
must be viewed as "deriving their just powers from the consent of the
g~verned,"~
and ultimately being attributed to the influence of both John
Locke4 and Jean Jacques Rousseau.'
One problem that the American legal system has encountered is the
enforcement of the limits set by the Constitution and statutes on government operatione6 Whether the government has exceeded its lawful

t Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1984-85;
Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Yale University; J.D. 1969, Columbia University.
I gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful editing suggestions of Professors Burton Leiser and
Donald H. Zeigler, and the research assistance of Steven Chananie, Jonathan Diamond, Veronica
Hakim, Teri Shulman, Sarah Whalen, and the staff of the Pace University Law Library.
1. U.S. CONST. preamble:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
2. Alexander Hamilton, arguing that the proposed adoption of a bill of rights was unnecessary and potentially harmful, relied heavily on the nature of the new American government. "Here,
in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of
NO. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). He
particular reservations." THEFEDERALIST
also characterized the Constitution as "professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants." Id.
3. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
4. See infra note 41.
5. J. R O U ~ ~ E ATHE
U , SOCIALCONTRACTAND DISCOURSES
(D. Cress ed. 1983).
6. It is universally recognized that the United States government was intended to be one of
carefully circumscribed powers, defined by enumeration. This limitation is, perhaps, most directly

Heinonline - - 7 3 Cal. L. Rev. 52 1985

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND STANDING

bounds is a question for the judiciary to decide, as Marbury v. Madison7
made clear. But who may ask the courts to decide? That question is
ordinarily resolved by application of the doctrine of standing.* In recent
years, questions of standing have been determined by application of a
two-part test. First, the court must examine whether the party seeking
relief has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional question^."^ Second, there must be "some connection between the official action challenged and some legally protected interest of
the party challenging that action."1° The first part of the test, commonly
referred to as injury-in-fact," is indispensable because it is viewed as part
of the case-or-controversy r e q u i r e m e n t ; 1 2 hence, it is juri~dictional.'~
reflected in the 10th amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST.amend. X.
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803).
8. The question of standing concerns whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See generally L. TRIBE,AMERICANC O N ~ O N LAW
A L $8 3-17 to -29
(1978).
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962). This first requirement, then, focuses on the party
seeking relief rather than on the nature of the relief sought.
10. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969). The phrase "legally protected interest"
has been rejected by the Court as conveying too restrictive a view of this part of the test. See infra
notes 217-26 and accompanying text. But current law still requires some nexus between the challenged official activity and a legally cognizable interest of the plaintiff. As Professor Tribe has
explained:
The nexus requirement bears a family resemblance to the "scope of the risk" doctrine in
the law of torts. Thus, in tort law, it is not enough that the defendant's violation of the law
caused injury to the plaintiff: the defendant also must owe the plaintiff some duty. Similarly, in the federal law of standing, it is not enough that the plaintiffbe injured by some act
or omission of the defendant; the defendant must additionally have violated some duty
owed to the plaintiff. Applying this doctrine to challenges of official government action or
inaction, the relevant question would not be simply whether the official or agency violated
the law, but rather whether the official or agency violated any duty to the plaintiff.
L. TRIBE,supra note 8, 8 3-22, at 98 (footnotes omitted).
11. See, eg., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 72-74 (1978). See generally L. TRIBE,supra note 8, 8 3-20.
12. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 5 2, cl. 1.
13. The Court explained the jurisdictional nature of the injury-in-fact test in 1982:
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. I11 requires the party who invokes the court's authority
to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone. Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91,99 (1979), and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and
"is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky WeYelfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner does Art. I11 limit the federal
judicial power "to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a
system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
through the judicial process." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. [83, 97 (196811.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (footnotes omitted). In the same opinion, the Court recognized:
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The second part of the test is commonly called the nexus requirement14
and is not constitutionally mandated.15 The nexus test, first announced
in FIast v. Cohen,16 requires examination of the substantive issues raised
in a case "to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.""
Unfortunately, this two-part test proved extremely difficult to apply,
leading the Court to observe in 1969 that "[tlhe concept of standing to
sue. . . 'is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere
in [the concept ofl justiciability' in general.'"' The nexus requirement in
particular has come under fire.
The search for nexus . . . risks begging the vital question of whether the
plaintiff is truly claiming injury to his own legally protected interest or
whether the plaintiff, although claiming a material injury, is in fact asserting the interests of someone else but should nonetheless be accorded
surrogate standing. Even when the nexus rule does not operate to deny
standing, therefore, it may entail substantial disadvantages.
Even more pointedly, the rule of nexus can induce denials of standing where a decision on the merits would be preferable.'g

As a consequence, Professor Tribe has advocated dropping the nexus requirement in many circumstances, particularly where official action is
[I]t has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of
the "standing" requirement have been required by Art. 111 ex proprio vigore, or whether
they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not compelled by
the language of the Constitution.
Id. at 471.
14. See, eg., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,78-81 (1978);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.83, 101-02 (1968). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 8, 4 3-22.
15. See, eg., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,78-81 (1978).
"Unlike the 'injury in fact' requirement, the 'nexus' requirement is clearly not compelled by article
111but represents only a prudential limitation upon the exercise of federal jurisdiction." L. TRIBE,
supra note 8, 8 3-22, at 97 n.2 (emphasis in original).
16. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). FIast was a taxpayer's challenge to government action that allegedly
violated the first amendment's establishment clause.
17. Id. at 102. The nexus requirement thus stated has two components. First, the taxpayer
must show a connection between his status as a taxpayer and the challenged activity. Id. Taxpayer
standing therefore requires a challenge to some exercise of the government's taxing power. second,
the taxpayer must show that the exercise of the taxing power violates a specific constitutional restriction on that power, rather than that the challenged activity merely exceeds a more general restriction
on govemmental power. Id. at 102-03.
It was unclear in FIast whether the nexus requirement applied to suits not brought by taxpayers
qua taxpayers. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,618 (1973), the Court applied the test in a
nontaxpayer suit. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. Five years later,-however, in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978), the Court explicitly
repudiated the test's applicability except in taxpayer suits. See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying
text.
18. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,423 (1969) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98
(1968)).
19. L. TRIBE,
supra note 8, 4 3-27, at 110.
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challenged as being lawless.20 Professor Tribe's suggestion parallels that
of Professor Davis, who observed:
The natural system is that of the common law: If A and B are private
parties and A hurts B, B has standing to get a determination of the legality of A's action. Why should not the law be the same, whether A is the
government, and [sic] agency, an officer, or a private party, and whether
the injury is to B's person, his physical property, or his intangible interests? Is not the natural system the simple one that injury in fact is
enough for standing?"
Thus, Professor Davis, too, would leave only the injury-in-fact requirement for standing, noting that "[tlhe only problems about staiding
should be what interests deserve protection against injury, and what
should be enough to constitute an injury."22
This Article supports Professor Tribe's and Professor Davis' suggestion, but on a different basis. In addition to the problems outlined above,
the Article suggests that the nexus requirement also overlooks one of the
fundamental characteristics of American government foreshadowed in
20. Professor Tribe believes that challenges to governmental action do, and should, stand on
special footing:
When official action is challenged on grounds of illegality, values beyond those tangibly
protected by the violated law or constitutional provision come powerfully into play. Both
the value of legality as such, and the public respect which rests on it, may be seriously
impaired whenever courts equipped to remedy an illegality at the behest of a factually
injured party allow clearly illegal procedures or results to stand on the sole ground that all
of the material interests required to be considered or "accommodated" by the statutory (or
even constitutional) scheme were satisfied with the official action. To say in such circumstances that the "abstract concern for vindicating the bare words of statutes seems too
attenuated a justification for disturbing mutually satisfactory arrangements struck by all of
the relevant public and private interests," is to deprecate the "relevant public interest" in
the rule of law. In any event, letting "mutually satisfactory arrangements" stand on such a
ground requires assuming or finding that those who are silent are indeed "satisfied" rather
than merely ignorant, impecunious, inadequately organized, or simply exhausted. At a
minimum, the requirement for nexus should be dropped and surrogate standing allowed
whenever a court has reasonable ground to believe that one of these alternative explanations has played a major role in the absence of any challenge by someone with direct
standing.
Id. § 3-27, at 111-12 (footnotes omitted). Thus, Professor Tribe argues that "if government's overriding duty to act lawfully is accorded serious weight," the nexus requirement ought to be abandoned as a matter of sound policy. Id. 5 3-28, at 113. Justice Powell has also suggested
abandoning the nexus test. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring). His views and Richardson are discussed infra in Part 11.
21. Davis, The Liberalized L o w of Standing, 37 U. C H I .L. REV. 450, 468 (1970). In this
respect, Professor Davis echoes Justice Frankfurter: "A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge
governmental action of a sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action
cognizable by the courts." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed, Justice Brennan concurs in this suggestion. See infra text
accompanying notes 221-25.
This Article suggests, however, that this injury-in-fact concept is underinclusive. Private parties, in their dealings with each other, are not bound by a charter by which one party creates the
other and gives him or her legitimacy. Because of the nature of American government, the Davis
tort metaphor fails at that point. See infra Part I .
22. Davis, supra note 21, at 468.
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the writings of John L ~ c k and
e ~ ~woven into the Constitution by the
Framers: the concept that rights, in addition to being individually held,
may also be held collectively by the body politic, which creates and proIn Professor Davis' terms,
vides the justification for civil g~vernrnent.~~
there are additional interests, as yet unrecognized in the law of standing,
that deserve protection against injury. The existence of collective interests has been widely recognized by courts and scholars,2' but not in the
context discussed here. Collective interests are most often discussed
when they are perceived to be in conflict with rights or privileges asserted
by an i n d i ~ i d u a l .They
~ ~ are not evaluated in terms of their impact on
the doctrine of standing. This Article suggests that there is a class of
cases where individual and collective interests, far from being opposed,
actually coincide--cases where the government is charged with violating
the Constitution. Moreover, in a significant subclass of those cases, current standing doctrine makes impossible both judicial protection of such
collective interests and judicial insistence that government operate only
within the bounds of the Constitution. The effect is that certain constitutional provisions effectively exist only at the whim and during the good
will of the government, because the collective interest in enforcement of
such provisions will not be protected by the courts. This Article urges,
therefore, that the existence and recognition of collective rights require a
modification of standing doctrine so that such rights can be protected
through judicial review.27
23. See generally J. LOCKE,TWOTREATISESOF GOVERNMENT
Second Treatise (P. Laslett ed.
1960).
24. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
25. See generally infra Part 111, Section B; see also Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests as a
Method of Constitutional Adjudication, 27 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 823 (1977).
26. See, cg., Moms v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983) (public interest in protection of
victim's rights balanced against individual's sixth amendment right to counsel); Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (public interest in open trials balanced against individual's 6th
and 14th amendment rights to fair trial); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (state's interest
in the health of a prospective mother and in the potentiality of human life balanced against individual's constitutionally based privacy interests in making the abortion decision); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972) (state's interest in universal compulsory education balanced against
individual's first amendment right to free exercise of religion); Carnara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 533 (1967) (public interest in enforcement of health and fire codes balanced against individual's
fourth amendment right to privacy); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-52 (1961) (public
interest in careful regulation of the fitness of attorneys balanced against individual's 1st and 14th
amendment rights to free association).
27. Professor Berger has suggested that a broad concept of standing is consistent with our
common law history in cases where illegal government action is challenged. His theory, however, is
based on the ready availability of the prerogative writs to English citizens without requiring personal
injury-in-fact and does not explicitly deal with more direct influences on the American process of
creating a national government. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALEL.J. 816 (1969). Other scholars have also proposed broadening the doctrine
of standing, effectively eliminating it in public actions, on the ground that it would be better policy to
do so. See, e.g., Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions (pt. l), 74 HARV.L. REV.
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The Article is presented in three Parts. Part I documents the enormous effect that Locke's political philosophy had on the Constitution's
Framers and traces the idea of collective rights through Locke's Second
T r e a t i ~ eshowing
,~~
how Locke viewed government as a trustee and society as the settlor-beneficiary that forms and gives legitimacy to the government. Part I1 reviews the development of the current doctrine of
standing and demonstrates how the current standing model creates a
class of cases where government may, with impunity, violate the Constitution. Part I11 demonstrates the anomaly of the Supreme Court's current doctrine in a society founded on the ideas of John Locke. It then
explores the constitutional provisions where collective rights have already been recognized by the courts,29though not with respect to standing analysis. Finally, Part I11 proposes a revision of the current test for
standing to ensure that vindication of society's collective rights is possible without creating universal standing and thus threatening the courts
with a tidal wave of litigation brought by "officious intermeddler^."^^
1

JOHNLOCKEAND THE FRAMERS
OF THE CONSTITUTION

It would be difficult to overstate John Locke's influence on the
American Revolution and the people who created the government that
followed it.31 One writer notes that most eighteenth-century liberal
doctrines can be traced to Locke and his concept that community power
1265 (1961); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF.
L. REV.68 (1984). But see Sedler, Assertion of
L. REV. 1308 (1982) (personal injuryConstitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF.
in-fact should be required for standing, and third parties should not be able to assert others' injuries
in order to get standing). By contrast, this Article proposes that it is not necessary to discard standing doctrine entirely in public actions; it merely is appropriate to recognize the full range of interests-individual and collectivedeserving protection under the Constitution.
28. J. LOCKE,supra note 23.
29. I have previously identified one such right that arises from the fourth amendment,
Doernberg, "The Right of the People'? Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the
259 (1983), but I focused on support of the collective fourth
Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
amendment right, implicit in the exclusionary rule, which is recognized by the Supreme Court itself.
This Article demonstrates that the concept of collective rights has antecedents in the philosophical
underpinnings of the American state.
supra note 8, 9 3-22, at 99.
30. See L. TRIBE,
31. Locke can be regarded as the advance ideologist of the American Revolution.
He developed a set of political ideas which has very largely served as the basis for American political values and for the institutional structure which American and British government has since assumed. His importance for American political thought can hardly be
overestimated; indeed, there is probably no better short summary of the ideas of Locke
than the American Declaration of Independence.
EXPERIENCE
47 (1964) (footnote omitted); see
D. MINAR,IDEASAND POLITICS:THEAMERICAN
also L. LEDER,LIBERTYAND AUTHORITY:EARLYAMERICAN
POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY 1689-1763,
at 37-40 (1968).
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resides in the majority.32 To be sure, the colonists were influenced by
other political philosophers as well, notably Blackstone, Hume,
Montesquieu, Paine, Rousseau, Sidney, and Adam Smith,33"[blut Locke
came nearest to the heart of the case. If an occasional criticism was
passed on his [specific proposals], as was done by John Adams,
it
was only to show how 'the most resplendent genius' may fail in
practice."34
This is not to say, however, that the Framers accepted his theories
completely and without question. In some ways, American political philosophy went beyond Locke's, as for example by its provisions for removal of officials and alteration of the form of government without
political revol~tion.'~But as a general matter, "the framers established
their government in frank Lockean style upon the consent of the gove ~ m e d . " The
~ ~ Framers truly rejected only Locke's concept of absolute
legislative supremacy over the executive and the courts, creating the
"three coequal branches,"37 which furnish the primary distinction be~ ~ distinctween the American and English systems of g o ~ e r n m e n t .This
tion is important to the theory of standing presented in this Article.
Before turning to the Supreme Court's development of the modem doctrine of standing, however, it is necessary to understand more of the phi-

...

32. Salvemini, The Concepts ofDemocracy and Liberty in the Eighteenth Century, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED
105 (C. Read ed. 1938).
33. MacIver, European Doctrines and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION
RECONSIDERED,supra note 32, at 51, 52; see also Salvemini, supra note 32, at 105.
34. MacIver, supra note 33, at 52 (quoting 4 WORKSOF JOHNADAMS463-64 (C. Adams ed.
1865)). The extent of the early American response to that genius is reckoned by MacIver to be
nearly universal. "Add to Locke's teaching Montesquieu's more explicit doctrine of division of powers, inject into it some republican fervor, and you have the whole substance of the Virginia Bill of
Rights, and indeed all the preambles, manifestoes, and declarations of principle that followed." Id.
at 53; see also E. DUMBAULD,
THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
AND WHAT IT MEANS
OF MEN 152, 161-62 (1966).
TODAY20 (1950); A. RANNEY,THE GOVERNING
Locke's influence on the American idea of separation of powers may have been as great as
Montesquieu's. Daniel Minar notes that it was Locke's version of the doctrine that "later was to
become so integral a part of the American political ideology and procedure." D. MINAR,supra note
31, at 52.
35. E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 34, at 77; see also infra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
36. Gabriel, Constitutional Democracy: A Nineteenth-Century Faith, in THE CONSTITUTION
RECONSIDERED,
supra note 32, at 247. Professor Mace notes, "Locke has long been considered the
Many go
political theorist who exerted the greatest influence upon our natural-rights heritage.
so far as to suggest his influence upon the American Founding Fathers was so great that the United
States may be termed a Lockean nation." G. MACE,LOCKE,HOBBES,AND THE FEDERALIST
PAP E R ~9 (1979) (footnote omitted). Professor Mace disagrees with this, however, concluding that
Hobbes' influence was more important. Id. at xii. The majority view, nevertheless, seems clearly to
be on the side of Locke.
37. See, cg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.683,707 (1974); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.306,
3 11 n.6 (1973).
38. MacIver, supra note 33, at 53.

...
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losophy that so influenced the Framers and then to examine the specific
reflections of Locke's ideas in American political thought.
A.

John Locke's Philosophy

John Locke is perhaps most commonly associated with the doctrine
of government by consent of the governed. Throughout the Second
T r e a t i ~ e ,Locke
~ ~ emphasized that civil government arises only when
people remove themselves from the state of nature by combining to form
Men being . . . all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out o f
this ~ s t a 6and
, subjectedto the Political Power of another, without his
own Consent. The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with
other Men to joyn
and unite into a Community, for their comfortable,
.
safe, and peaceable living one amongst another. . . . When any number
of Men have so consented to make one Community or Government, they
are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick, wherein
the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest.41
-

39. J. LOCKE,supra note 23.
40. "To those that say, There were never any Men in the State of Nature; I will not oppose the
But I moreover affirm, That all Men are naturally in that State, and remain so, till
Authority.
by their own Consents they make themselves Members of some Politick Society . . . ." Id. $ 15, at
295-96; see also id. $99, at 351, $ 102, at 352-53, $8 104-106, at 354-56, $ 171, at 399-400.
41. Id. $ 95, at 348-49 (emphasis in original). Moreover, because few people entering an established civil society affirmatively consent to its government, and to avoid the illegitimacy that would
result from such a mass absence of consent, Locke constructed a theory of tacit consent, struggling
to ensure that the theory was neither oppressive nor illusory:
[Elvery Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any
Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to
the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this
his Possession be of Land, to him and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or
whether it be barely travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the
very being of any one within the Territories of that Government.
Id. 8 119, at 365-66 (emphasis in original). Thus, Locke premised the entire existence of government
on his theory of consent. Indeed, it has been noted that "[tlhere is no point which Locke insisted
upon more constantly and more forcefully than that all legitimate governments rest upon the conOF JOHNLOCKE
sent of the governed." S. LAMPRECHT,
THEMORALAND POLITICALPHILOSOPHY
136 (1918). But Locke expanded the consent idea by hypothesizing a form of tacit consent embracing virtually all persons not actively engaged in forming the new state.
Students of civil procedure will recognize the genesis of two famous cases in the preceding
quotation. Locke clearly foreshadows the declaration in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
that, for in personam jurisdiction over the defendant to exist, "it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253. And,
though perhaps less emphatically, Locke's reliance on free travel upon the highway as a basis for
inferring consensual submission to governmental power anticipated Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352

...

(1927):

[I]n advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its highway by a non-resident, the State
may require him to appoint one of its officials as his agent on whom process may be served
in proceedings growing out of such use. .
p h i s Court has recognized the] power of the
State to exclude a non-resident until the formal appointment is made. And, having the

..
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One reason this part of Locke's theory is so well known is its apMoreover, the concept is
pearance in the Declaration of Independen~e.~~
routinely referred to in cases where governmental action is challenged on
constitutional grounds.43 But one cannot properly understand Locke's
political theory solely in terms of his idea of government by consent.
Indeed, even the consent theory itself cannot be understood in isolation
from the rest of the Second Treatise. Consent is, of course, the hallmark
of a properly governed society. "The unmistakeable sign of civil society
having come into being is when every individual has resigned up to the
society or the public his individual power to exercise the law of nature
and protect his property."44 But several questions remain: How should
the consented-to government exercise its power?45 More important,
what relationship should the government have to those who have consented to its existence, whether explicitly or tacitly?46
Government in a Lockean society is the product of a compact
among people.47 Government is, in fact, the creation of such a compact,
power so to exclude, the State may declare that the use of the highway by the non-resident
is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be
served.
Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted).
42. See supra text accompanying note 3. The doctrine is also well known because it is ancient.
See, eg., PLATO,Crito, in THE FOUR
SOCRATIC
DIALOGUES
OF PLATO112 (B. Jowett trans. 1903).
43. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,233 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64
(1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
44. Laslett, Introduction to J. LOCKE,supra note 23, at 106.
45. The manner in which a Lockean government is to exercise its power is beyond the scope of
this Article. Locke considered this topic extensively in chapters IX through XI11 of the Second
Treatise. J. LOCKE,supra note 23, $9 123-168, at 368-98.
46. Much has been written about Locke's concepts of individual rights and his limitations on
the power of government in recognition of those rights. See, e.g., R. LEMOS,HOBBESAND LOCKE:
POWERAND CONSENT103-08 (1978); Laslett, supra note 44, at 99-106. Professor Kendall has
suggested, however, that Locke is properly viewed as an extreme majority-rule democrat, whose
attention to individual rights is, at best, incidental to his main thrust. W. KENDALL,JOHNLOCKE
AND THE DOCTRINE
OF MAJORITY-RULE
(1959). Professor Kendall is not alone in this view. Professor Macpherson suggests that Locke's view of individualism necessarily implies a collective view
of society because Locke's political civil society is supreme over the individual.
The wholesale transfer of individual rights was necessary to get sufficient collective force
for the protection of property. Locke could afford to propose this transfer because the civil
society was to be in the control of men of property. Under these circumstances individualism must, and could safely, be left to the collective supremacy of the state.
Macpherson, The Social Bearing of Locke's Political Theory, in LOCKEAND BERKELEY:A COLLECTION OF CRITICALESSAYS227 (C. Martin & D. Armstrong eds. 1968).
Whether or not the Kendall view of Locke is entirely accurate, it begins to bring into focus the
relationship of the people to government as developed in the Second Treatise. Each person in the
state of nature is entitled to enforce natural law individually. See J. LOCKE,supra note 23, $$ 6-8, at
288-90, $ 13, at 293-94. But in society the enforcement rights and power are collective.
47. See J. GOUGH,THE SOCIALCONTRACT(2d ed. 1957). The idea of government as the
product of a compact or contract is echoed in early American history. Jefferson accepted the contract theory as representative of an agreement among the states, id. at 236-37, and the contract idea
in fact appeared in many state constitutions through the mid-1800's, id. at 231. Justice Story saw the
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yet it is not a party to the compact. As Professor Laslett points out:
If a contract is to be set up, or understood, it is necessary that the parties
to it should each get something out of it, and applied to politics this
would mean that the government got something out of governing which
the subjects are bound to give. Now this is what Locke was most anxious
to avoid. Although contractually related to each other, the people are
not contractually obliged to government, and governors benefit from governing only as fellow members of the "Politick Body." They are merely
deputies for the people, trustees who can be discarded if they fail in their
trust.48
Thus, government may not properly insist upon any rights accruing to it
from the people's compact. It is merely a functionary, "defined and limited by the end for which political society is e~tablished."~~
Hence, the nature of the formative process of civil government gives
rise to the concept of government-as-trustee-a political trust for the
public good in which the people are at once settlors and beneficiarie~.~~
Proper understanding of the trusteeship and the manner in which it differs from the social compact that creates civil government is essential to
understanding Locke and his importance to modern American concepts
of rights against the government and standing to enforce them. Locke
distinguished the process of compact, which creates a community, from
the further process by which the community entrusts political power to a
government. In other words, Locke saw both a "contract of society" and
a "contract of government," though
for Locke, this second "contractyyis
not a contract at all-it is a trust."
arrangement as an implicit contract between the community as a collective whole and each individual member, wherein the community agreed to protect its citizens on the condition that they obey its
laws. Id. at 237. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793), Chief Justice Jay describes the Constitution as "a compact made by the people of the United States." See also Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S.113, 124 (1876) (" 'A body politic.' as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen,
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good.' "); J. LOCKE,supra note 23, 5 97, at 350, 3 99, at 351.
48. Laslett, supra note 44, at 113 (citations omitted).
Although whoever holds legislative power is constitutionally supreme within the limits of
the Constitution, they are nevertheless still only the fiduciary agents of the community. As
such, they are subject to the supreme power of the community and subject to removal by
the community if in its judgment they have violated their trust.
R. LEMOS,supra note 46, at 122.
49. Laslett, supra note 44, at 111.
50. The concept obovernment as trustee is not unique to Locke. " m h e idea of trust was also
very common in the seventeenth century, and while it is possible that eighteenth-century writers
took it from Locke rather than from other authors, it is clear that it was already a political commonJOHN LOCKE'SPOLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY
156 (2d ed. 1973).
place before Locke's time." J. GOUGH,
In fact, Gough traces the trust idea, at least with respect to the executive, back to the thirteenth
century and the reign of Richard 11. Id. at 165; see also Laslett, supra note 44, at 112. For a general
supra, at
discussion of the development of trust theory in English political thought, see J. GOUGH,
154-92.
51. See Laslett, supra note 44,at 112-13.
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Several writers suggest that Locke's repeated resort to the trust meta p h o P should not be taken to connote a trust in a literal or formal
sense.53 Yet it is clear in the Second Treatise that he uses the term as
more than a synonym for "confidence," and that this heightened use of
the trust concept is fully reflective of the political thought of his time.54
For example, John Milton, having a view of the origins of civil society
similar to Locke's, argued that "the power of Kings and Magistrates is
nothing else, but what is [only] derivative, transferred and committed to
them in trust from the people, to the Common good of them
Locke's detailed discussion of trust demonstrates the existence of
the trust and the collective nature of its creation. The legislature's
supreme power
is not, nor can possibly be absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and Fortunes of the People. For it being but the joynt power of every Member of
the Society given up to that Person, or Assembly, which is Legislator, it
can be no more than those persons had in a State of Nature before they
enter'd into Society, and gave up to the ~ o m m u n i t y . ~ ~

Locke saw a two-step progression from the state of nature to civil society:
first the combination of individuals into society, and second the vesting
of power in the legislature as a trust.57 Because the legislature's power is
only derived from "a positive voluntary Grant and Institution" by the
people, it cannot be transferred by the legislature to any other hands.58
Thus, Locke's legislature functions within the trust metaphor.
In emphasizing that the transfer of power from community to legislature is a delegation rather than an alienation, Locke explicitly makes
the legislature's power subordinate to the people's "Supream Power to
remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them."5g Consequently, the legislature is
52. J. L o c ~ ~ , s u p note23,
ra
$9 22, 110-111, 134, 136, 139, 142, 149, 155-156, 164, 171, 210,
221-222, 226-227, 231, 239-240, 242.
supra note 47, at 175-78; Laslett, supra note 44, at 112.
53. See, e.g., J. GOUGH,
54. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
I N ENGLISH
12 (A.
55. Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magktrafes, in 40 Y A L ESTUDIES
Cook & W. Allison eds. 1911). Such thought was true in practice as well as in theory. During the
trial of Charles I, the prosecutor explicitly presented his case to the court as a breach of trust matter,
arguing that by reason of Charles' breach, he was required to answer to his superiors, the people who
supra note 50, at 169 (citing J. MUDDIMAN,T H ET R I A LOF
had established the trust. J. GOUGH,
CHARLES
I (1928)). Gough also notes that the trust theory appeared, in some respects anticipating
Locke's theory, in the work of Philip Hunton in 1643, id. at 171, and in R. FERGUSON,
A BRIEF
JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRINCE
OF ORANGE'S DESCENT
INTO ENGLAND
(1689), where the execusupra note 50, nt
tive powers of the king are described as having been delegated in trust. J. GOUGH,
175. Further, "the accession of James I was soon followed by far-reaching constitutional disputes
between king and parliament, in which the trust concept came to be freely used." Id. at 176.
56. J. LOCKE,supra note 23, $ 135, at 375-76 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. 9 136, at 376-77.
58. Id. $ 141, at 380-81.
59. Id. $ 149, at 384-85 (emphasis in original).
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responsible to the body politic in a far more direct way than to any individual member of
The legislative power is explicitly "limited to the
publick good of the S ~ c i e t y , "and
~ ~ it is to the society that the legislature
is r e s p ~ n s i b l e . ~ ~
The theory of trust so explicitly applied to the legislative power also
affects the executive. For example, the limited power to call the legislature into session is one of trust, to be exercised for the benefit of the
people.63 Moreover, even though the executive may be given certain prerogatives by the legislature to deal with unforeseen circumstances, the
prerogatives themselves must be "imp~oyedfor the benefit of the Community, and suitably to the trust and ends of the G ~ v e r n m e n t . " ~ ~
In all circumstances, therefore, Locke not only views the institution
of government as a trust, but also as one created by the collective body of
the people and responsible to it. "Locke suggests that the society as trustor assigns to the government as trustee a fund of power to be exercised
on behalf of the safety (or pleasure) of the individuals of the communit^."^' The obligation created by the trust is one way; the governmentas-trustee is obligated to the people, not they to it.
The collective aspect of Lockean society extends even to the point
where government ceases to function properly. Perhaps the most important demonstration of the community's collective voice is found in
Locke's concept of the right of revolution. The Second Treatise discusses
dissolution of government at length,66and explicitly considers the problem of a populace oppressed by its government.
But if any one should ask, Must the People then always lay themselves
open to the Cruelty and Rage of Tyranny? . . . I Answer: Self-defence
is a part of the Law of Nature; nor can it be denied the Community, even
against the King himself. . . . This therefore is the Priviledge of the
People in general, above what any private Person hath; That particular
Men are allowed . . . to have no other Remedy but Patience; but the
Body of the People may with Respect resist intolerable Tyranny. . . .67
The collective right of revolution may be exercised whenever "tyranny"
60. In this respect, of course, the structure of Locke's political system supports the views of
Kendall and Macpherson that Locke is a collective, majoritarian democrat. See supra note 46.
Locke's view of the legislature's responsibility to the collective body politic finds its ultimate
expression in his right of revolution, discussed infra at notes 66-100 and accompanying text.
supra note 23, 8 135, at 375-76 (emphasis in original); see also id. 3 171, at 39961. J. LOCKE,
400,9 216, at 427, 9 229, at 435.
62. Locke's view of the continuing responsibility of the legislature to the people contrasts
sharply with Hobbes' insistence on the absolute rights of the sovereign once created by the social
compact. See T. HOBBES,LEVIATHAN 113-20 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1960).
63. J. LOCKE,
supra note 23, 9 156, at 389-90.
64. Id. 9 161, at 393.
65. D. MINAR,supra note 31, at 49.
66. J. LOCKE,supra note 23, $9 21 1-243.
DE REGNOET REGALIPOTE67. Id. 5 233, at 438-39, (quoting (in translation) w. BARCLAY,

Heinonline - - 7 3 Cal. L. Rev. 63 1985

[Vol. 7352

CALIFORNIA LAW REVlE W

64

occurs, that is when government acts beyond purposes specified by the
people.68 Thus, the collective rights that underlie the f~rmationof civil
government also give rise to the collective right to dissolve the government when the people's trust is breached.69
This treatment of the right of revolution illustrates the pervasive effect that the method used to form a civil society has upon the society's
relationship with the government it creates. It also exemplifies a corollary to the theory of trust: government is accountable to the people as a
whole. The right
of revolution Locke describes is no more than a method
by which the accounting may be made; the accountability must be to the
group, not to any individual member of it.70

B.

The Influence of John Locke on American Political Thought

Locke's direct influence on the formation of the new American government is evident in many places. The first statement of American governmental principles is the Declaration of Independence, and here
Locke's impact is ~nmistakable.~~
Implicit in the Declaration is the "social compact" theory, that a people
is a political organization of persons, who, having theretofore lived in a
"state of nature" without being united by any political bonds, associate
BUCHANANUM,
BRUTUM,BOUCHERIUMET RELIQUOS MONARCHOMACHOS
supra note 41, at 143.
(1600)); see also S. LAMPRECHT,
68. J. LOCKE,supra note 23, 8 199, at 416.
69. The right of revolution, however, was limited by Locke to cases where government had
actually breached its trust.
Locke . . .insisted that government was merely the bearer of executive power on trust for
the community. But in Locke's case remnants of the belief in a contract between the community and the government had restricted the right of revolution against the government
to occasions when government had betrayed its trust or failed in its proper task.
F. HINSLEY,SOVEREIGNTY
153-54 (1966). Moreover, the right of revolution was not exercisable in
response to isolated acts of tyranny; resistance was authorized only when there was a calculnted
governmental design to subvert the law. J. FRANKLIN,
JOHNLOCKEAND THE THEORYOF SOVEREIGNTY 95 (1978). On the other hand, government's failure to comply with the conditions for its
existence created not merely a right, but a duty to overthrow the government. See R. AARON,JOHN
LOCKE286 (1937); R. LEMOS,supra note 46, at 121-22; A. RANNEY,supra note 34, at 151.
70. See S. LAMPRECHT,supra note 41, at 146, where the author notes that under Locke's
theory, the majority of the people
. create the social compact, so only the majority
.
. may
. dissolve it. No
minority is ever warranted in disturbing the peace of the community by resisting government. Thus,
the right
- of revolution is designed,
- - in Locke's view, to deal with the situation where government fails
to rule within its proper boundaries. Professor Kendall compares the relationship to that of agent
and principal.
The relation between the government of the day in Locke's system and the society from
which it derives its powers is, quite simply, assimilable to that between principal and agent
in Anglo-American law; and for the government to claim vis-2-visthe society for which it
acts powers which the society has not entrusted to it would, on Locke's showing, be as
preposterous as for an agent to claim, vis-2-vis his principal, a freedom to do in the latter's
name things which the latter does not wish [to be] done.
W. KENDALL,supra note 46, at 96 (emphasis in original).
71. See E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 34, at 42; see also A. KELLY& W. HARBISON,
THEAMERICAN CONSTITUTION:ITS ORIGINSAND DEVELOPMENT
90 (1948).

STATI ADVERSUS
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themselves together and bind themselves by compact for the purpose of
establishing government. It is the voluntary union of individuals that
creates the "people" or state for secular political purposes, just as under
the Puritan covenant theory it creates the church for religious
purposes.72

The parallel to Locke's political theory is patent. One finds Locke's
ideas, however, even more directly evidenced in the Declaration. "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
compares with Locke's "Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free,
The Declaration's assertion of the people's
equal and inde~endent."~~
right to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happine~s"~'is traceable to
Locke's "Life, Liberty and E ~ t a t e . ""[Tlo
~ ~ secure these rights,"77 referring to the trilogy of "unalienable" rights, reflects Locke's view of the
state of nature as understood by Jefferson. Such rights are not "created"
but rather are "secured" because they antedate government; they are
rights people enjoy even in the state of nature.78 Finally, the well-known
phrase "deriving their just powers from the consent of the g~verned"'~
corresponds directly to Locke's assertion that "Men are naturally free,
and the Examples of History shewing, that the Governments of the
World, that were begun in Peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the Consent of the People."80 Indeed, Richard
Henry Lee of Virginia complained that Jefferson had copied the Declaral
influence on Jefferson is certainly not surtion from L o ~ k e . ~Locke's
prising, since Jefferson spoke of Locke as one of the three greatest men of
all time8' and regarded Locke's work as one of the " 'elementary books
of public right.' "83
Locke's influence did not stop with Jefferson or his Declaration of
E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 34, at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
J. LOCKE,supra note 23, 9 95, at 348.
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
J. LOCKE,supra note 23,s 87, at 341. Moreover, the phrase "pursuit of happiness" is said
to appear in Locke's philosophical writings. E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 34, at 60.
77. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
78. E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 34, at 63; see ako J. LOCKE,supra note 23, 6, at 289.
79. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
80. J. LOCKE,supra note 23, $ 104, at 354 (emphasis in original); see also id. $ 119, at 365-66.
supra note 34, at 56. "The Declaration of Independence was almost pure
81. E. DUMBAULD,
RECONSIDLocke." Elliott, The Constitution as the American Social Myth, in THE CONSTITUTION
ERED, supra note 32, at 216. One author is kinder to Jefferson than was Mr. Lee: "[Wle would
hardly know of [Jefferson's] familiarity with John Locke's Two Treatises of Government if he had not
incorporated passages almost word for word in the Declaration of Independence, apparently unaTHE
ware that he was doing so." E. MORGAN,AMERICANSLAVERY,AMERICANFREEDOM:
ORDEALOF COLONIALVIRGINIA375 (1975).
82. MacIver, supra note 33, at 52. The other two were Newton and Bacon. Id.
83. C. WILTSE,THEJEFFERSONIAN
TRADITIONIN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
46 (1935) (quoting WRITINGS,XVI, 118-19 (May 8, 1825) (Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee)).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

?
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Independence. Historian Clinton Rossiter notes that Samuel Adams can
,~~
properly be regarded as an intellectual descendant of L o ~ k e and
Locke's concept of the state of nature is implicit in Benjamin Franklin's
views of the American Indian~.'~Moreover, "[iln his natural-rights assumptions, his moderation, and his reasonableness, Locke was an intellectual godparent of James Madison, the Father of the Constituti~n."~~
Indeed, the builders of the American government routinely referred to
Locke's writings with respect and reverence.''
Locke's flavor is found as well in documents other than the Declaration of Independence. His ideas were adopted by a 1774 resolution of the
North Carolina Assembly asserting that governmental invasion of liber~~
philosophy on revolution
ties was justification for r e v ~ l u t i o n .Locke's
may well have contributed to the first amendment's provision of the right
to petition for redress of grievance^.^^ And while Locke's famous trilogy
of life, liberty and estateg0 became transmuted to the more popularly
known life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in 1776,91it reappeared
substantially in its original form in the fifth and fourteenth amendm e n t ~ Nor
. ~ ~ was Locke's influence limited to these three amendments.
"The blended traditions of Coke and Locke were conveyed into the incipient stream of American constitutional law by the bills of rights of the
early State constitutions and by judicial review, which soon after 1800
became a feature of all of them."93 For example, Professor Elliott traces
American constitutional structure directly to Locke, either as an intentional imitation or as a partial reaction to Locke's emphasis on majority
rule.94 Elliott notes that Locke drew directly from the Magna Carta,
84. C. ROSSITER,1787: THE GRANDCONVENTION68 (1966). But Adams went beyond
Locke-he rejected the possibility of tacit consent to government by the governed, insisting instead
that consent be explicit. MacIver, supra note 33, at 54.
85. MacIver, supra note 33, at 52.
~ A L PART 2: FROMMACHIAVELLI
TO
86. L. MCDONALD,W ~ R PN~ L I ~ THEORY,
BURKE326 (1968). Locke's theory of government was reflected in other colonial thought as well,
notably the works of James Otis and John Dickenson. See D. MINAR,supra note 31, at 72-76.
OF INDEPENDENCE
75-76 (1942). One even finds refer87. C. BECKER,THE DECLARATION
ence to the works of Locke as the subjects of specific testamentary bequests, as was done, for example, by Josiah Quincy in 1774. Id.
supra note 34, at 104.
88. E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 34, at 104-05.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; E. DUMBAULD,
90. J. LOCKE,supra note 23, 8 87, at 341.
91. A. KELLY& W. HARBISON,
supra note 71, at 90; see also Elliott, supra note 81, at 216.
92. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Actually, Locke's original form was reflected earlier in
American thought. "The first resolution of the Declaration [of Rights published by Congress in
1774 was] an echo of John Locke [in providing that] ail men are entitled to life, liberty, and property,
and that they cannot be deprived of these rights without their consent." R. RUTLAND,THEBIRTH
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 27 (1955).
~
GOVERNMENT
172 (1948). Professor Minar sees Locke's
93. E. CORWIN,L I B E RAGAINST
natural rights philosophy carried through the Declaration of Independence into its "most effective
operational form in the American Bill of Rights." D. MINAR,supra note 31, at 51.
94. See Elliott, supra note 81, at 217-18; cf. W. KENDALL,supra note 46.
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which the colonists used to justify the American revolution. Moreover,
he traces the text of sections nine and ten of article I and all of the Bill of
Rights directly to Locke's influence. Thus, the Constitution, as well as
the Declaration of Independence, is traceable to Locke's natural rights
philosophy-the concept that some rights cannot be alienated by individuals in forming a government. The Bill of Rights "built upon the ideas of
that English philosopher whose pioneering work first grappled with the
fundamentals of society in terms of the balancing of freedom and
rights-John L o ~ k e . " ~ ~
Wholly apart from Locke's traceable influence on particular documents, American society adopted Locke's view of the relationships between governed and government and among the governed themselves.
Locke's contract analogy was used by eighteenth-century citizens to explain these relationship^,'^ and the system of American government reflects Locke's concept of government as the product of a contract among
people rather than between rulers and ruled." Americans espoused a
natural rights philosophy, which became the foundation of the American
political system. "They endorsed the Lockean theory of a state of nature,
inalienable natural rights, a social compact, a society rooted in popular
sovereignty, the consent of the governed, and the right of revolution
under conditions of intolerable oppres~ion."~~
The American political system has, however, modified Locke's
model by developing two methods of governmental accountability other
than revolution: the elective process and judicial review.99 The electoral
process allows the people to replace those exercising government's power
when the people believe government action is unwise. The judicial process is explicitly reserved to correct governmental actions perceived to be
u n l a ~ ~ f u l .Thus,
'~
when government violates the basic statements of
95. Shotwell, Freedom-Its Histoly and Meaning, in FREEDOM:
ITSMEANING12-13 (R. Anshen ed. 1940).
96. G. WOOD,THECREATION
OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 289 (1969).
97. Id. at 601; see also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
THEDEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENT
101 (1967).
98. N. RIEMER,
99. Locke himself emphasized that resort to extra-legal force was not justified so long as reRESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL
RADIcourse to law remained. See P. MAIER,FROM
CALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN
OPPOSITION
TO BRITAIN,1765-1776, at 32 (1972).
100. In fact, the courts explicitly refuse to consider whether governmental acts are wise or unwise. See, eg., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-92 (1938);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197

U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905).

?

The Constitution "incorporated an instrument which was to reduce the supreme legislature of
Locke's thinking (and Jefferson's) to the 'creature of the Constitution.' That instrument was, of
course, the Supreme Court . . .through which the doctrine of judicial review developed." Elliott,
supra note 81, at 218. The remaining question, however, concerns who shall speak for the collective
society in the courts when government acts outside of its powers but not so far as to make revolution
appropriate. That question will be considered infra in Parts I1 and 111.
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constitutional principle, the structure of the modified Lockean society
suggests resort to the courts. In cases where government abuses cannot
be corrected by resort to the polls, the right to government accountability
can only be safeguarded by the courts. The next part of this Article,
therefore, considers the Supreme Court's approach to the right of people
to challenge unconstitutional government action, a concept dealt with in
large part under the rubric of standing.

In recent standing case^,'^' the Supreme Court has struggled to develop standards to determine which issues are appropriate for judicial
resolution. Determining whether a particular matter is fit for judicial
resolution embraces more than the doctrine of standing to be discussed
here; it truly concerns the broader concept of justiciability. In Flast v.
Cohen,lo2the Court noted:
[Tlhe judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to
"cases" and "controversies." . . . Embodied in the words "cases" and
"controversies" are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those
words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of
art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine. lo3

Standing, like the judicial doctrines concerning political questions,
advisory opinions, and mootness, was created to limit judicial power to
cases in which adversarial presentation is possible and legislative or executive prerogatives are not infringed. lo4 The exact contours of these doctrines limiting justiciability, however, are by no means clear;lo5 they
involve "a blend of constitutional requirements and policy
considerations." lo6
Standing concerns whether the party seeking to invoke the judicial
101. For purposes of this Article, "recent" refers to cases beginning with Flast v. Cohen, 392

U.S. 83 (1968),

after which, this Article suggests, the problems with traditional standing began to
appear forcefully.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

392

U.S.83 (1968).

Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 97; see also supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
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power is the appropriate party to do so. "The fundamental aspect of
standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before
a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adj~dicated."'~'
Doctrines other than standing focus on the issues. Thus, though a plaintiff may have standing, the courts may decline to adjudicate his case because it raises a political question or is moot.'08 Conversely, the courts
may refuse to adjudicate otherwise justiciable matters on the ground that
the plaintiff lacks standing.'Og This Part will focus on the latter category
of cases. Many of the cases falling into this category present the troubling prospect of issues that are, or should be, justiciable but for which
no potential plaintiff exists. This Part will also compare these cases with
contemporaneous cases in which plaintiffs were found to have standing
to determine whether there are principled differences between the two
groups.
A. Denials of Standing
1. The Early 1970's

In Sierra Club v. Morton,"' the Supreme Court considered an environmental protection suit brought by the Sierra Club against the Secretary of the Interior challenging the proposed development and use of
certain federal lands. While the Court found that aesthetic injury was
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing,"' it nonetheless dismissed the
action for lack of standing because the Sierra Club, apparently for tactical reasons, chose not to allege harm to specific club members or individual~."~
The Court required the party seeking standing to allege "more
107. Flost, 392 U.S. at 99; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
108. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (declaring the controversy moot despite plaintiffs standing); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (political question); Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (political question).
109. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), discussed infra in notes 110-16 and
accompanying text.
110. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
111. Id. at 734. The Court treated the case as one of first impression, noting that its prior cases
did not address "the question, which has arisen with increasing frequency in federal courts in recent
years, as to what must be alleged by persons who claim injury of a noneconomic nature to interests
that are widely shared." Id.
112. Thus, it is possible to read Sierra Club narrowly as a case involving a defect in pleading
rather than announcing any new ideas about standing. While as a technical matter this may be
correct, such a reading ignores what was truly going on in Sierra Club. Certainly a broad reading of
the complaint, as encouraged by FED.R. CIV. P. 8 0 , see, ag., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957); United States v. White County Bridge Comm'n, 275 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S.818 (1960), would have permitted the inference that the required individualized injury existed,
particularly in light of one paragraph of the complaint, which the Court felt compelled to quote
before disregarding.
[with] approximately 78,000 [mem"Plaintiff Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation
. . For many years the Sierra Club by its activities and conduct has
bers] nationally
exhibited a special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national

..

...
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than an injury to a cognizable interest . . . . [Tlhe party seeking review
[must] be himself among the injured."' l 3 Although the Court recognized
it was unwillthe public interest aspect of the Sierra Club's ~omplaint,"~
ing to recognize such a "public action" unless the public's representative-the plaintiff-alleged personal harm. l5 In so holding, the Court
made it clear that the concept of a plaintiff acting as the public's representative might still be viable, but not in the absence of some allegation of
individual injury to the would-be repre~entative."~
In 1973, the Court turned its attention from injury-in-fact and expanded the scope of the nexus test in Linda R.S. v. Richard 0. There,
the mother of an illegitimate child challenged Texas' practice of refusing
to enforce its penal statute addressing nonsupport of children against
parents of illegitimate children. The plaintiff asserted that the state's
practice denied her child equal protection. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case on standing grounds. Justice Marshall,
writing for the majority, readily conceded that the plaintiff had satisfied
the injury-in-fact requirement, but held that she had failed to satisfy the

'

'"

parks, game refuges and forests of the country, regularly serving as a responsible representative of persons similarly interested. One of the principal purposes of Sierra Club is to
protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Its interests
would be vitally affected by the acts hereinafter described and would be aggrieved by those
acts of the defendants as hereinafter more fully appears."
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8 (quoting complaint at 1 3). At the same time, the Court specifically
noted the possibility of the Sierra Club amending its complaint after remand to the district court. Id.
at 736 n.8. Professor Nichol observes that the same sort of inversion of the normal pleading rules
can be seen in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), and Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975). Nichol, supra note 27, at 72 n.25. Simon and Warrh are discussed itgra in
notes 159-78 and accompanying text.
Justice White is reported to have been especially exasperated with plaintiffs' failure or refusal to
prepare themselves to meet the standing question. " 'Why didn't the Sierra Club have one goddnmn
member walk through the park and then there would have been standing to sue,' White remarked,
& S. ARMSTRONG,
THEBRETHREN164
before joining the four-member majority." B. WOODWARD
n.* (1979).
113. Sierra CIub, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
114. Id. at 736-37.
115. The Court also noted, id. at 736 n.9, with apparent disapproval that the Second Circuit hnd
recognized representative standing of the type asserted by the Sierra Club in Citizens Comm. for the
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.), cerr. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
116. The Court's reliance upon the injury-in-fact test reflected earlier standing decisions, notably Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). FIasr, in fact, sets
out what is now taken as the basic framework of standing inquiry by delineating the two-part test for
standing. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text. The Court insisted on an allegntion of
individual injury even though it favorably noted the emerging trend toward recognition of
noneconomic injuries as appropriate predicates for standing.
m h e interest alleged to have been injured "may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic values." But broadening the categories of injury that may be
alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that
the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.
Sierra Club, 405 U.S.at 738 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970)).
117. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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nexus test."* Specifically, the Court found that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated either that the absence of support payments resulted from
nonenforcement of the penal law section, or that enforcement, if ordered,
would cause support payments to begin.llg Thus, the majority was not
satisfied that the plaintiffs injury resulted from violation of the constitutional right on which she based her complaint.
The Court next denied standing in United States v. Richardson120
and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War.121 In
Richardson, a taxpayer sought to have the Central Intelligence Agency
declared unconstitutional because it allegedly permitted a type of
accounting for funds inconsistent with the requirements of the accounta~ ~ Court, in a five-to-four decision, ruled that Richardbility ~ 1 a u s e . lThe
son had no standing.124 Although the plaints sued as a taxpayer, he
failed the nexus test125because his attack on the CIA's practice was not
based on the taxing and spending power.126 The Court, therefore, found
that Richardson was "seeking 'to employ a federal court as a forum in
which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of
government.' "12'
The majority did not rest on the nexus ground alone; it went on to
118. Flast, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
119. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618. Justice White took issue with the majority's lack of faith in
the salutary effect of threatened penal sanctions.
I had always thought our civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanctions had
something more than a "speculative" effect on a person's conduct. . . . Certainly Texas
does not share the Court's surprisingly novel view. It assumes that criminal sanctions are
useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their support obligations to their legitimate children.
Id. at 621 (White, J., dissenting).
120. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
121. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
122. 50 U.S.C. $8 403a-403j (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
123. U.S. CONST.art. I, $ 9, cl. 7: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."
Before suing, Richardson had sought copies of the CIA's financial statements from the Government Printing Office, which referred his request to the Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of
the Department of the Treasury. That office provided him some general records of expenditures, but
reported that it had no information specifically relating to CIA expenditures. Richardson thereupon
asked the Treasury Department to seek the Attorney General's opinion of the constitutionality of the
CIA Act, and only upon the Department's refusal to do so was the action commenced. Richardson,
418 U.S. at 168.
124. The district court had dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Third Circuit, sitting
en banc, reversed with three judges dissenting. Of the majority in that court, three judges found that
Richardson had taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); and one judge found
that he had citizen standing. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc),
rev'd, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
125. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
126. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175; see U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 1.
127. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
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explain that Richardson could not demonstrate injury-in-fact from the
challenged practice.
"It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke
the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative
action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
The Court declined to recognize Richardson's interest as differentiable
from that of any other member of the public. If there was any injury, the
Court refused to find that Richardson was harmed more than anyone
else.'29 Thus, the majority found that Richardson failed to satisfy any
part of the test for standing. In this respect, Richardson echoed the insistence of Sierra Club that the plaintiff must plead and be prepared to
prove injury to himself as an individual, obviously an impossibility in the
sort of case Richardson brought. At the same time, the Court purported
not to leave Richardson remediless. "In a very real sense," the Court
held, "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political proc e ~ s . " ' ~The
~ plaintiff, therefore, was admonished to take his case to the
ballot box, 13' an idea repeated in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War.'32
In Schlesinger, several members and former members of military reserve units who were opposed to the war in Viet Nam challenged the
constitutionality of members of Congress holding commissions in the
military reserves. 133 In an analysis similar to that in Richardson, a six-to128. Id. at 177-78 (quoting Ex parre Levitt, 302 U.S.633, 634 (1937) (per curiam) (emphasis
supplied by the Richardson Court)).
129. The Court relied explicitly on Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S.633 (1937). Levitt, a member of
the Supreme Court Bar, challenged Justice Black's elevation to the bench on the ground that
Justices' retirement benefits had been increased while Justice Black served as Senator from Alabama,
and that his appointment therefore violated the ineligibility clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 6, cl. 2:
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any
civil Office under the Authority of the United States, . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been
encreased during such time.
The Court, per curiam, found Levitt without standing and declined to consider the matter further.
130. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
131. There are several problems with the Court's suggested political substitute for judicial intcrvention. See infra notes 307-27 and accompanying text.
132. 418 U.S.208,227 (1974): "Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the
political processes."
133. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a Congressman's membership in the
reserves violated the incompatibility clause, U.S.CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[Nlo Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office"). In addition, the plaintiffs sought an injunction barring the Secretary of Defense from enrolling
any member of Congress in the reserves and directing the Secretary to strike from the reserve rolls

. . ."

.

Heinonline - - 7 3 Cal. L. Rev. 72 1985

19851

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND STANDING

73

three
found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The majority
affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiffs lacked standing as taxpayer~,'~'but overturned its conclusion that they had standing as
citizens. 1 3 ~
The Court focused upon the plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate any
injury-in-fact or any individual interest differentiable from that of the
citizenry generally.13' The majority noted that recent cases had broadened standing by expanding the concept of judicially cognizable inbut declined to regard that trend as an abandonment of the
injury-in-fact test.13' " 'Abstract injury is not enough.' "la The Court
concluded by discussing the policy reasons for refusing to recognize citizen standing:
All citizens, of course, share equally an interest in the independence of
each branch of Government. In some fashion, every provision of the
Constitution was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a generalized
interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a "case or controversy"
appropriate for judicial resolution. The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens
are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.141

Therefore, as in Richardson, the Court found the political process was
any member of Congress then enrolled, to discharge any Reservist subsequently elected to Congress,
and to recover any pay given to members of Congress as Reservists. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 211.
134. Justice Stewart moved from the dissent in Richardson into the majority in Schlesinger,
explaining in the latter that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that the defendants had refused to
perform an affirmative duty under the Constitution and that, in such circumstances, none of the
petitioners could demonstrate injury-in-fact. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228-29 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
135. Id. at 215-16. The plaintiffs had asserted four bases for standing in the district court: as
persons opposed to the United States' involvement in Viet Nam; as officers and enlisted personnel of
the reserves who were not members of Congress; as taxpayers; and as citizens. The district court
upheld standing only on the citizen theory. See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F.
Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), a f d mem., 495 F.2d 1075 @.C. Cir. 1972), rev'dsub nom Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
136. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 224.
137. Id. at 217. The Court noted that this sort of generalized grievance had been rejected as a
basis for taxpayer standing. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)). The Court has never
explained why the fact that all citizens might wish to challenge governmental conduct inconsistent
with the Constitution logically suggests a finding of no standing.
138. Id. at 218 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970)).
139. Id. at 218-19 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)).
140. Id. at 219 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)). The Court also regarded Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), as long-standing authority for this proposition. See
supra note 129.
141. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 226-27 (footnote omitted). This Article suggests that citizen standing is appropriate in cases like Schlesinger and proposes a theory of standing that does have boundaries. See infra Part 111, Section C.
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the appropriate remedy.142
The Richardson dissenters were quick to note the implications of the
Court's ruling. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that
Richardson was a typical Hohfeldian plaintiff, seeking to exercise his
right to receive information and to compel the government to fulfill its
corresponding duty to supply it.143 Indeed, Justice Stewart pointed out
that if the government had owed Richardson money rather than information, no one would have questioned his standing. "I see no reason for a
different result when the defendant is a Government official and the asserted duty relates not to the payment of money, but to the disclosure of
Justice Stewart, therefore, would have found
items of inf~rmation."'~~
that whenever government owes an affirmative duty under the Constitution, injury-in-fact is established by the nonperformance of that duty.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Schlesinger, would also have found
standing based on both citizenship and taxpayer status.'45 Referring to
the injury-in-fact requirement, he noted:
We have insisted that more than generalized grievances of a citizen be
shown, that he must have a "personal stake in the outcome." . . But
that "personal stake" need not be a monetary one. In Baker v. Carr it
was the right to vote, an important badge of citizenship. The "personal
stake" in the present case is keeping the Incompatibility Clause an operative force in the Government by freeing the entanglement of the federal
bureaucracy with the Legislative ranch.'^^

.

Justice Douglas, therefore, would have held each citizen's interest in the
proper operation of government-an interest that the Schlesinger majority regarded as too abstract to be judicially cognizable-sufficient to support standing.14'
Justice Marshall also would have found citizen standing in
Schlesinger. Marshall noted that the incompatibility clause was intended
142. Seesupra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 307-27 and accompanying text.
143. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 203 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALEL.J. 15
(1913) and Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigont in Public Actions: The Holrfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968)). For Hohfeld, a plaintiff could bring suit only if he was vindicating
a right for which there was a correlative duty owed him by the defendant.
144. Id. at 203 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
145. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 232 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. at 234 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
147. Justice Douglas distinguished Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), the case challenging
Justice Black's appointment to the bench, see supra note 129, on the ground that standing had been
denied there because the injury claimed under the incompatibility clause was too speculative, since it
involved retirement benefits that might never accrue rather than salary. He noted that Justice Blnck
never received any retirement benefits.
at 234-35 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Whether this distinction is persuasive is
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to avoid conflicts of interest.14' In his view, the plaintiffs' complaint did
not necessarily reflect the interests of all citizens in having government
abide by the Constitution. Rather, the complaint concerned the plaintiffs' first amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances and to have a government free of conflicts of interest when it
~ ~ Marshall found injury-in-fact to be a
considered such ~ e t i t i 0 n s . lThus,
specific constitutional right and distinguished this injury from the abstract complaint that the majority found to be insufficient to sustain
standing.
Justice Brennan, in a dissent addressed to both Schlesinger and
Ri~hardson,''~would have found standing in each. As to Richardson,
Justice Brennan argued that injury-in-fact was established because
Richardson had a personal right to receive the budget information concerning the CIA.'" And in Schlesinger, he would have found injury-infact by reason of plaintiffs' taxpayer tatu us.''^
Addressing the nexus requirement, Justice Brennan argued that it
was not properly a part of standing analysis:
The Court's further inquiry, in each of these cases, into the connection
between "the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question," . . . and the "interest sought to
be protected by the complainant," . . . is relevant, not to "standing" but,
if at all, only to such limitations on exercise of the judicial function as
justiciability . . . or reviewability. . .
Justice Brennan thus viewed injury-in-fact as the only test for standing.
Thus, although a substantial minority of the Court had articulated
preferences for a broader concept of standing in public actions, by the
mid-1970's the Court had developed two distinct approaches using standing to restrict access to the courts. The first, exemplified by Sierra Club
v. Morton and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,'"
focused upon a plaintiffs failure or inability to plead sufficient injury-infact distinguishable from some generalized loss suffered by the public at
denied
large. The second, exemplified by United States v. Richard~on,"~
148. Scltlesirger, 418 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 239-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 235 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Stewart.
See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
152. Scl~lesinger,418 U.S. at 236-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For that reason he declined to
discuss whether the majority-rejected concept of citizen standing was appropriate. Id. at 237
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan did not indicate
when he abandoned the Flast nexus requirement. In Flast, he had joined the Court's opinion. See
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
154. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
155. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
156. 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
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standing because the plaintiff failed to show a sufficient nexus between
the harm he suffered and the constitutional right under which protection
was claimed.I5' The distinction between these two approaches is important. By the Court's own analysis, a finding of no injury-in-fact is a constitutional bar to federal court jurisdiction, whereas failure to meet the
nexus requirement establishes only a prudential impediment to federal
court action.I5' The cases of the early 1970's focused far more on the
first approach, a constitutional test that bodes ill for broader concepts of
standing.

2. Standing in the Mid-1970's
In Warth v. Seldin,'59 the Court employed both the injury-in-fact
and nexus tests, but it did so more restrictively than in Sierra Club or
Richardson. Warth was brought by a kaleidoscope of plaintiff^'^^ challenging a suburban zoning ordinance on the ground that it was tailored
to exclude low- and moderate-income persons in violation of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871.16' A bitterly divided Court held that
none of the plaintiffs had standing. With respect to the low-income
plaintiffs, the Court noted that although they had pleaded deliberate exclusion of low-income racial and ethnic minority groups by the zoning
ordinance, the plaintiffs had not pleaded that they had been personally
excluded. The Court held that the complaint, therefore, failed to plead
the individual injury required under the Constitution to confer standing.I6' The individual plaintiffs in Warth had pleaded injury to the group
157. Richardson, of course, involved both approaches; the Court found that the plaintiff had
satisfied neither the injury-in-fact test nor the nexus test. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying
text.
158. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. Thus, in cases where the Court finds no
injury-in-fact, one must either take issue with the Court's definition and application of that term or
dispute the theory that the injury-in-fact requirement is based on article 111's case and controversy
language and is therefore jurisdictional. This Article urges the first of these two approaches. See
infra Part 111. The nexus requirement, by contrast, may be opposed either, as Professor Tribe has
done, on the ground that it serves to deny standing when a decision on the merits would be preferable, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text, or on other nonconstitutional grounds, see ittjro
Part 111, Section A.
159. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
160. The plaintiff group included low-income individuals desiring to move to the suburb; urban
taxpayers claiming that their taxes were higher because the zoning ordinance caused the city to have
more low-income residents in need of municipal services; a not-for-profit corporation formed to
foster low-income housing opportunities; and several builders and housing associations who asserted
an interest in creation of low-income housing in the suburb. Id. at 493-97, 503.
161. Id. at 493; see Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (1982).
162. Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-05. The Warth plaintiffs had sued as representatives of a class, id.
at 493 n.1, which presumably encompassed individuals who had been excluded. The Court, however, found that the absence of personal injury to the named individuals precluded them from relying
upon injury to others, id. at 502-05 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) and Bailey v.
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of which they were members, unlike the plaintiff in Sierra Club,163but
the Court still found the pleading insufficient because the plaintiffs had
not pleaded injury traceable to particular individuals. Warth, therefore,
seemed to deny standing in a situation in which the Sierra Club Court
apparently would not have. The Court, though recognizing that the de-

--

Patterson, 369 U.S.31 (1962)), and thus implicitly held that such plaintiffs would not satisfy the
typicality requirement of FED.R. CIV. P. 23(a).
During the 1970's and early 1980's, the Court developed a variation on the Sierra Club and
Warth theme of inability to show personal injury. Under the variation, the Court looked to the
likelihood of future personal injury in cases where the plaintiff sought injunctive, as opposed to legal,
relief. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the plaintiff had been
stopped for a traffic violation. He asserted that though he had not resisted, he had been choked by
the arresting officer, causing him to lose consciousness and to suffer damage to his larynx. Id. at 9798. Evidence showed that Los Angeles police officers were trained in the use of two types of
chokehold, id. at 97 n.1, that the officers were permitted to use chokeholds even when they were not
threatened with injury or resistance, id. at 99, and that 16 persons had died from chokeholds applied
by Los Angeles police officers. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against future police use of such chokeholds.
The Court held that the federal courts could not grant equitable relief because Lyons was unable to
show any likelihood that he would be choked again, and therefore had not shown injury-in-fact. Id.
at 105-06. Thus, the Court made clear that unless the government were to establish an unconstitutional policy in terms general enough to apply with certainty to any plaintiff, injunctive relief would
never be available because a plaintiff would be unable to show a sufficient likelihood of future harm
to him, even though it might be obvious that such harm would occur to large numbers of people. See
id. This result, according to the majority, was not new doctrine; it merely reflected the Court's
earlier decisions in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974), both of which involved challenges to official practices alleged to be unconstitutional and
racially motivated. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102-05.
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, charged that the
majority's reliance upon O'Shea and Rizzo was misplaced because neither case had involved specific
plaintiffs' allegations of past injury to themselves in addition to the need for prospective equitable
relief. Id. at 113, 123-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also assailed the Court for
"fragmenting the standing inquiry and imposing a separate standing hurdle with respect to each
form of relief sought." Id. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that the Court should focus
instead upon whether a plaintiff has standing to litigate a claim, as distinct from whether, having
presented his claim, he is entitled to a particular form of relief. Id. Finally, Justice Marshall pointed
out that the federal courts were powerless in a constitutional system restrained by a Lyons concept of
standing:
The Court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional violations from the equitable
powers of a federal court. It immunizes from prospective equitable relief any policy that
authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can establish with substantial certainty that he will be injured, or injured again, in the future.
JUSTICEasked in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
The CHIEF
. (1971) (dissenting opinion), "what would be the judicial response to a police order
authorizing 'shoot to kill' with respect to every fugitive?" His answer was that it would be
"easy to predict our collective wrath and outrage." We now learn that wrath and outrage
cannot be translated into an order to cease the unconstitutional practice, but only an award
of damages to those who are victimized by the practice and live to sue and to the survivors
of those who are not so fortunate. Under the view expressed by the majority today, if the
police adopt a policy of "shoot to kill," or a policy of shooting 1 out of 10 suspects, the
federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its continuation. . . . The federal judical power
is now limited to levying a toll for such a systematic constitutional violation.
Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
163. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying
text.

..
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fendant's actions might have increased housing costs in the suburb, also
refused to find a causal link between those actions and the plaintiffs' ex~ 1 u s i o n . lFinally,
~~
the majority characterized the harm to the individual
plaintiffs as too speculative and remote.
Regarding the taxpayer plaintiffs, the Court found that even were
they able to satisfy the injury-in-fact test,166they would be relying upon
violations of the rights of others who were discriminated against in housing rather than upon their own rights. The Court found that the taxpayers failed the nexus test.16' Similar reasoning was used to deny standing
to the associations claiming that the exclusion of certain groups from the
suburb caused them economic injury.168 Finally, the Court found that
the builders association, which sought damages, alleged no pecuniary
loss to itself and could not recover on behalf of its members. Its claim for
prospective relief was barred because there were no allegations of current
~ ~ the
building projects being frustrated by the zoning 0 r d i n a n ~ e . IThus,
Court used the two-part test to deny standing to all of the plaintiff^.'^^
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky WeIfare Rights Organi~ation'~~
continued the Court's increasingly restrictive view of standing by requiring that
the causal link between government's wrongful act and plaintiff's injury
be precisely pleaded. The plaintiff, a coalition of indigent individuals
seeking hospital care and organizations representing indigents' interests,
164. Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-07.
165. Id. at 507.
166. Id. at 509. The taxpayer plaintiffs asserted that the exclusion of low- and middle-income
residents from the suburb placed a greater burden on the municipality to provide tax abatements for
low- and moderate-cost housing. This, in turn, was alleged to increase the tax burden of city residents in order to finance essential public services. Id. at 508-09.
167. Id. at 509-10.
168. Id. at 512-14.
169. Id. at 515-17. In this respect, the Court paralleled its treatment of Sierra Club's claim in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
170. Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that three of the groups of plaintiffs clearly had standing. Warth, 422 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting). First, he would have granted standing to the
low-income and minority plaintiffs because their complaint alleged sufficient, specific instances of
concrete injury suffered as a result of the exclusionary practices of defendants. Id. at 523-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, with respect to the two organizational plaintiffs, he would have found
their "allegations of past injury, which members of both these organizations have clearly made, and
of a future intent, if the barriers are cleared, again to develop suitable housing" sufficient to demonstrate the "requisite personal stake in the outcome of rhis controversy." Id. at 530 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Justice Brennan then pointed out that in order to deny standing, the majority had demanded
first, that the low-income and minority plaintiffs plead an unprecedented, "unachievable specificity"
in showing the nexus between defendants' actions and plaintiffs' alleged injury, id. at 528 (Brennan,
J., dissenting), and second, that the organizational plaintiffs "allege the (economically) impossiblel'-specific concrete injuries with respect to a particular, current project, id. at 530 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that the Court's disposition of the case reflected its unexpressed feelings on the merits more than it reflected any principled analysis of standing concepts.
See infra note 263.
171. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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challenged a newly modified Internal Revenue Service ruling that allegedly encouraged hospitals to refuse care to indigent patients while allowing the hospitals to retain their status as charitable organizations.
The organization argued that the ruling violated congressional intent embodied in the Internal Revenue Code's provision exempting charitable
organizations from taxation. The Court held that the organization
lacked standing on the narrow but significant ground that it had failed to
establish that the revenue ruling had caused the hospitals to deny treatment to its mernber~."~The plaintiff was, therefore, unable to demonstrate that a favorable judgment would redress the harm that its
members had suffered.'73
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to show that the hospitals denying the plaintiff coalition's members treatment were within the ambit of the modification
~ ~ he sharply criticized what he
wrought by the challenged r ~ 1 i n g . lBut
viewed as an addition to the injury-in-fact test by the majority:
Nothing in the logic or policy of constitutionally required standing is
added by the further injury-in-fact dimension required by the Court today-that respondents allege that the hospitals affecting them would not
have elected to forgo the favorable tax treatment and that this would
"result in the availability to respondents of' free or below-cost medical
services.175
Thus, Justice Brennan repudiated the heightened causality requirement
used by the Court in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.176
172. Id. at 41-43. "It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by
the hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id. at 42-43.
The problem in Simon was not one of pleading, as Justice Brennan made clear in his concurring
opinion. Defendants sought summary judgment on the question of standing, specifically attacking
the causation question. Id. at 53 (Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice Brennan noted,
At this point in the litigation, it was clearly incumbent upon the respondents to make a
showing sufficient to create a material issue of fact whether there was any connection between the hospitals affecting them and the Ruling alleged to be illegally "encouraging" taxexempt hospitals to withdraw the provision of indigents' services, thereby injuring respondents' "opportunity and ability" for such services. . . . No such showing was made.
There is absolutely no indication in the record that the contested Ruling altered the operation of these hospitals in any way . . . .
Id. at 53-54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
173. In this respect, the Court echoed its opinion in Linda R.S.v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617-18 (1973). See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
174. Simon, 426 U.S. at 47-50, 53-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was referring to the majority's assertion that:
[i]t is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this
suit would result in the availability to respondents of such services. So far as the complaint
sheds light, it is just as plausible that the hospitals to which respondents may apply for
service would elect to forgo favorable tax treatment . . .
Id. at 43.
176. 410 U.S. 614 (1973); see supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.

.
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It is unclear in the aftermath of Simon whether the new twist to the
injury-in-fact test that Justice Brennan criticized has actually become a
permanent part of constitutional concepts of standing. Certainly the new
factor was not necessary to the decision in Simon, and therefore it may be
regarded as dictum.'77 If so, however, it was the dictum of at least six
members of the C o ~ r t , "and
~ thus it may play a role in future decisions.

3. Standing to Raise Fourth Amendment Claims
Beginning in 1978, the Court decided a series of fourth amendment
cases that radically changed the concept of standing in that area. The
seminal case was Rakas v. Illinois,179where passengers in a vehicle that
was stopped and searched were held to lack standing under the fourth
amendment to challenge the search. The Court eviscerated a doctrine
under which anyone legitimately on searched private premises had standing to challenge the search.lS0 Instead, the Court said that the standing
inquiry was whether the defendant's own fourth amendment right of privacy had been invaded by the search.lS1 At the same time, the majority,
led by Justice Rehnquist, announced that the vocabulary of standing
would no longer be used in fourth amendment cases.
[Tlhe question necessarily arises whether it serves any useful analytical
purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing, distinct from the
merits of a defendant's Fourth Amendment claim. . . . [W]e think the
better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.Is2
Despite this language, Justice Rehnquist insisted that the new approach
would result in no doctrinal change.ls3 Nonetheless, Rakas had the effect of denying standing to a defendant who clearly would have had it in
prior years.
177. The plaintiffs failed to show that the hospitals had refused service because of the ruling and
not because of other factors. Since they made no such showing of causality, plaintiffs lacked standing. Therefore, the Court never had to examine, under some heightened causality requirement,
whether the hospitals would actually provide the services if the ruling were overturned rather than
deny the services and forgo the tax advantages. See also Allen v. Wright, 105 S. Ct. 51 (1984), in
which the Court reiterated the reasoning of Simon, again as dictum, in denying standing to parcnts
of black school children seeking to challenge Internal Revenue Service tax-exempt status conferred
upon allegedly discriminatory private schools.
178. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's concurrence. Justice Stevens did not participate
in the case. Simon, 426 U.S. at 28.
179.
180.
448 U.S.
181.
182.
183.

439 U.S.128 (1978).

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.257,265-67 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci,
83, 85 (1980).

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138-40.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 139.
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The trend begun in Rakas continued in United States v. S a l v u c ~ i , ~ ~ ~
Rawlings v. K e n t u ~ k y , and
' ~ ~ United States v. Payner,lS6 each of which
denied defendants standing to challenge fourth amendment searches that
they would have been able to attack before Rakas.18' Review of these
cases makes it clear that Rakas, Salvucci, Rawlings, and Payner all had
demonstrated injury-in-fact: the government proposed to introduce material seized in contravention of the fourth amendment in evidence
against the defendants. The Court denied standing, however, because it
found that the defendants were asserting someone else's fourth amendment privacy interest, not their own.e88 In essence, the Court raised the
same objection to standing in the fourth amendment context as in Warth
v. Seldin:lg9 defendants in the fourth amendment cases were said to lack
standing because they could not connect the injury they unquestionably
suffered with a personal constitutional right. In this sense, they failed to
satisfy the nexus test.lgO Close reading of the fourth amendment standing cases reveals that the Court has retreated to use of the legally-protected-interest test, which it had repudiated explicitly in 1970 in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.lgl Indeed,
this may be the reason that Justice Rehnquist was so eager to abandon
standing terminology in fourth amendment standing cases; to do otherwise wouId have made the inconsistency clearer.192

4.

The Decision in Valley Forge

The Court's most recent consideration of taxpayer and citizen
standing came in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 1 r ~ c . lThe
~ ~ Court denied standing to a
nonprofit taxpayer organization and four of its employees who argued
184.
185.
186.
187.

448 U.S.83 (1980).
448 U.S. 98 (1980).
447 U.S. 727 (1980).

For a detailed description of these cases, see Doernberg, supra note 29; see also Burkoff,
Tlre Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary
Doctritze, 58 OR. L. REV. 151 (1979); Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing Afier Rakas v.
Illinois: From Property to Privacy and Back, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 197 (1981).
188. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.83, 95
(1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34
(1978); accord Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) ("What petitioners appear to
assert is an independent constitutional right of their own to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
189. 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
191. 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970); see infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan interprets Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), as having abandoned this legally-protected-interest test. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
192. See generally Burkoff, supra note 187; Doernberg, supra note 29; Mickenberg, supra note
187.
193. 454

U.S. 464 (1982).
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that conveyance of a parcel of land by the federal government to Valley
Forge Christian College violated the establishment clause. The five-tofour majority held that, although plaintiffs had alleged " 'depriv[ation] of
the fair and constitutional use of [their] tax dollar,' "Ig4 they nonetheless
had failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact.lg5
The Court based its conclusion on two grounds. First, the Court
seemed to return to the limitation on taxpayer standing first announced
in Frothingham v. MeIIon. lg6 It limited Flast v. Cohen,lg7a case allowing
taxpayer standing, to challenges of congressional, rather than executive,
action.19* Second, the Court found that the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, were
not challenging any exercise of power under the taxing and spending
clause'99 (as was the case in Flast), but rather were objecting to the subsequent disposition of property that the plaintiffs conceded the government had lawfully acquired through expenditure of tax funds.200
The majority also attacked the lower court's decision to allow the
plaintiffs standing as citizens. The Third Circuit had noted that the
plaintiffs' real interest was not as taxpayers, but as persons interested in
maintaining the rigorous separation of church and state.201The majority
sharply criticized the assertion that the plaintiffs had shown sufficient
violation of personal constitutional rights rather than generalized citizen
grievances, which the Court in the past had found insufficient to confer
standing.
194. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 476 (quoting Respondent's Amended Complaint at app. 10).
195. Id. at 485.
196. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
197. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
198. Valley Forge, 454 U.S.at 479. In dissent, Justice Brennan took sharp issue with this reading of Flast, accusing the majority of "wrenching snippets of language from our opinions," and of
pernicious to our
creating "tortuous distinctions . . . [that] are specious, at best: at worst,
constitutional heritage." Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He went on to rebuke the Court for
artificially limiting Flast to challenges of Congressional power, noting that in Flast, the plaintiffs
challenged executive action of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to authority granted by Congress, precisely as in Valley Forge. Id.
199. U.S.CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 1.
200. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480 & n.17.
201. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.464 (1982). The Supreme Court
majority relied upon the Court of Appeals' own opinion to support the majority's argument that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to standing as taxpayers. The Court of Appeals had analyzed plaintill's'
true interest, cutting through the verbiage imposed upon them by previous standing cases to deal
explicitly with their actual concern.
Plaintiffs have no reason to expect, nor perhaps do they care about, any personal tax saving
that might result should they prevail. The crux of the interest at stake, the plaintiffs argue,
is found in the Establishment Clause, not in the supposed loss of money, as such. As a
matter of primary identity, therefore, the plaintiffs are not so much taxpayers as separationists . . . .
619 F.2d at 261.

...
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This reasoning process merely disguises, we think with a rather thin veil,
the inconsistency of the [lower] court's results with our decisions in
Schlesinger and Richardson. . . . [Alssertion of a right to a particular
kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. I11 without
draining those requirements of rneaning2O2
At the same time, the majority recognized the possibility that under its
analysis, cases might arise in which no one would have standing.
Respondents' claim of standing implicitly rests on the presumption that
violations of the Establishment Clause typically will not cause injury [to
anyone] sufficient to confer standing under the "traditional" view of Art.
111. But "[tlhe assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue,
no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."'03
This Article suggests, contrary to the Court's implication, that the absence of standing for any possible plaintiff is indeed a matter for concern.
Such an absence of possible plaintiffs may not, of course, by itself be a
reason to allow standing. It is, however, a matter of some gravity if situations exist where the government may, with impunity, violate the Constitution because no one is able to challenge the government's action in
Justice Brennan's vehement dissent traced the development of taxpayer standing doctrine and then argued that rights under the establishment clause are personal rights specifically designed, at least in part, to
protect taxpayers.205 Brennan also criticized Frothingham v. M e l l ~ n , ~ ~ ~
the seminal taxpayer standing case. He questioned its "obscure" reasoning and implicitly challenged Frothingham's reliance upon the indirectness of the connection between the taxpayer's remittance and the
government's e~penditure.'~' "Frothingham also stressed the indirect1
1standing, if the
ness of the taxpayer's injury. But, as a matter of Art. 1
causal relationship is sufficiently certain, the length of the causal chain is
irrelevant."208
In fact, Justice Brennan noted that Frothingham contained an "unstated premise," which had been identified in Justice Harlan's Flast dissent: the notion that taxpayer standing, if it existed at all, should be
based on citizens' generalized grievances concerning government actions,
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

202. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483.
203. Id. at 489 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227
(1974)).
204. See generally infra Part 111.
205. Val/eyForge, 454 U.S. at 500-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "It is clear
that one of the
primary purposes of the Establishment Clause was to prevent the use of tax moneys for religious
purposes!' Id. at 504 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
207. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

...
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rather than on some mythical injury-in-fact attributable to an individual
taxpayer.'09 I n support of that notion, Brennan argued that Flast was a
special case, applicable only to taxpayer claims involving the first amendment religion clauses and not to standing generally.210 Justice Brennan
then argued that establishment clause cases themselves are special cases
for taxpayer standing purpose^.'^'
It may be that Congress can tax for almost any reason, or for no
reason at all. There is, so far as I have been able to discern, but one
constitutionally imposed limit on that authority. Congress cannot use
tax money to support a church, or to encourage religion. That is "the
forbidden exaction." . . . In absolute terms the history of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment makes this clear. History also
makes it clear that the federal taxpayer is a singularly "proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction" to challenge a federal
bestowal of largesse as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Each,
and indeed every, federal taxpayer suffers precisely the injury that the
Establishment Clause guards against when the Federal Government directs that funds be taken from the pocketbooks of the citizenry and
209. Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Harlan's entire dissent was based upon
that unstated premise:
[The] taxpayer's complaint can consist only of an allegation that public funds have been, or
shortly will be, expended for purposes inconsistent with the Constitution. The taxpayer
cannot ask the return of any portion of his previous tax payments, cannot prevent the
collection of any existing tax debt, and cannot demand an adjudication of the propriety of
any particular level of taxation. His tax payments are received for the general purposes of
the United States, and are, upon proper receipt, lost in the general revenues.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Earlier in the opinion, Justice
Harlan had discussed this problem in more explicit terms:
[Tlaxpayers' interests in the expenditure of public funds [are not] differentiated from those
of the general public by any special rights retained by them in their tax payments. The
simple fact is that no such rights can sensibly be said to exist. . . .The national legislature
is required by the Constitution to exercise its spending powers to "provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare." Art. I, 5 8, cl. 1. Whatever other implications there mny
be to that sweeping phrase, it surely means that the United States holds its general funds,
not as stakeholder or trustee for those who have paid its imposts, but as surrogate for the
population at large. Any rights of a taxpayer with respect to the purposes for which those
funds are expended are thus subsumed in, and extinguished by, the common rights of all
citizens. To characterize taxpayers' interests in such expenditures as proprietary or even
personal either deprives those terms of ail meaning or postulates for taxpayers a scintilla
juris in funds that are no longer theirs. . . . We must recognize that these non-Hohfeldian
plaintiffs complain, just as the petitioner in Frothingham sought to complain, not as taxpayers, but as "private attorneys-general." The interests they represent, and the rights they
espouse, are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at random from among the general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike.
Id. at 118-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
This Article does not disagree with Justice Harlan's characterization, but argues instead that in
certain circumstances it is appropriate to adopt a broader concept of standing, consistent with the
existence of such collectively shared interests, as the only effective available means to correct governmental wrongs. See infra Part 111.
210. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 507-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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placed into the coffers of the ministry.212
Thus, Justice Brennan realized that some claims of government misbehavior are not amenable to adjudication under traditional standing doctrine. But instead of insisting in procrustean fashion, as the majority did,
that cases should be made to fit the standing doctrine, Justice Brennan
implicitly suggested that the doctrine should be modified to fit the cases
so that the judiciary could redress government wrongs. By the time Valley Forge was decided, however, a decade of Supreme Court standing
decisions had made it clear that access to the federal courts in constitutional cases was far more limited.213 Yet the trend toward narrower
standing was not without its interruptions, as the next Section
demonstrates.

B.

Grants of Standing

The Court began the 1970's by distinguishing questions of standing
from questions involving the merits. In Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. CampY2l4the Court considered a private
corporation's challenge to a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency
that permitted banks to make nonbanking data-processing services available to other banks and bank customers. The plaintiff alleged that the
ruling violated the Bank Service Corporation Act215and permitted banks
212. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 45 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)). At the same
time, Justice Brennan noted the practical impossibility of a taxpayer challenge at the time of collection of the funds, rather than when they are disbursed. This, he argued, militates in favor of a
subsequent establishment clause challenge even though a successful challenge may not directly benefit the taxpayer-plaintias pocketbook. Id. at 509-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Standing is not the only device that the Supreme Court used to narrow the availability of a
federal forum for consideration of constitutional challenges during the 1970's. In a series of cases
beginning in 1971, the Court announced the reemergence of a federal abstention doctrine based on
considerations of comity, equity, and federalism. Under the doctrine, federal courts could not consider constitutional questions arising in state criminal proceedings, except at the Supreme Court level
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 1257 (1982), when such questions could be decided by the state tribunals
themselves. The doctrine's purpose was to avoid undue interference with state criminal justice systems. Younger v. Hams, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). As the decade progressed, this bar to federal action
expanded to cases where the state proceeding was only quasi-criminal, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975), to some cases where the federal proceeding commenced before the state criminal proceeding, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), to cases where there was no state criminal proceeding pending at all, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.362 (1976), and finally to cases where the
state proceeding was clearly civil, see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434 (1977). The Younger doctrine and the Supreme Court's reluctance to permit the federal
courts to enforce federal constitutional guarantees have been sharply criticized. See, e.g., Zeigler, A
Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative Histoty of Reconstruction, 1983
DUKE
L.J. 987. In all of the Younger line of cases, the plaintiffs clearly had standing, but the Court
employed other justiciability doctrines in order to deny them access to the federal courts.
214. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
215. Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. 5 1864 (1962) (significantly amended 1982): "No
bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for
banks."
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to compete unlawfully with nonbanking organizations. The district
court dismissed the action for lack of standing and the court of appeals
affi~med."~

The Supreme Court used Camp to clarify the injury-in-fact requirement. The Court easily found that the plaintiff had demonstrated injuryin-fact. The anticipated loss of future business to competing banks, plus
the plaintiffs allegations that present customers had been lured away by
a particular bank, constituted sufficient injury. In so holding, the Court
rejected the court of appeals' requirement of injury to some legally recognized interest of the individual-an interest conferred by statute or contract--or to some public interest where the plaintiffs standing was
congressionally re~ognized.'~' "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is
The plaintiff need only
show that he was in the "zone of interests" protected by the statute. The
unanimous Court went on to emphasize that the interest need not be
economic, but that it might reflect " 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic value^."''^ The Court thus took an expansive view of the injury-in-fact test and did not require that the plaintiff
allege a violation of a law designed for his protection, as required by the
nexus test. In these respects, the Camp Court was far more liberal than
--

216. Association of Data Processing Sew. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn.
1968), offd,406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
217. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. Thus, under the legally-protected-interest test, the plaintiff would
have had to show that the Bank Service Corporation Act's restriction, see supra note 215, was intended to protect its members from increased competition or that they had some common law or
constitutional right to be free from such competition. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Tertn, 84
HARV.L. REV. 1, 177-81 (1970). The absence of such a right would have deprived the plaintiff of
standing. Under the test adopted in Camp, it was sufficient that the plaintiff was injured by defendant's failure to require banks to operate within the restrictions of the Act, since such operation
would have, as a practical matter, relieved the plaintiff of the burden of competition from banks.
218. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. In Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), decided with Camp, the
Court reiterated the disutility of the legal interest test. Barlow was brought by tenant farmers challenging an amendment to a Department of Agriculture regulation that dealt with assignments of
funds received pursuant to the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C. Ej 590h(g)
(1982). The lower courts ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing because no legally protected interest had been invaded. Barlow, 397 U.S. at 163-64. The Court rejected this narrow view of standing,
and held that the plaintiffs were "within the zone of interests protected by the Act," id. at 164,
because there clearly had been congressional intent to benefit tenant farmers. Id. at 164-65. The
Court did not, however, elaborate on the extent to which the "zone of interests" concept was broader
than the "legally protected interests" concept.
219. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154 (quoting Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965)). Interestingly, the Court noted in dictum that
"[a] person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give
standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause arid the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
(citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)). The assertion is clearly at odds
with the Court's subsequent disposition of Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Seesupra notes 193-212 and accompanying
text.
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the Courts that later decided Valley Forge, Schlesinger, and
Ri~hardson.~~'
Justice Brennan concurred in the results of Camp and the companion case of Barlow v. Collins,221but disagreed with the Court's standing
analysis. He noted that the Court used a two-step inquiry in Camp, asking first whether plaintiff had suffered injury-in-fact and second whether
the interest asserted was within the zone of protected interests.222 But,
he argued, the second step was inappropriate to standing analysis since it
looked to the merits of the controversy or to its general j u s t i ~ i a b i l i t y . ~ ~ ~
I had thought we discarded the notion of any additional requirement
when we discussed standing solely in terms of its constitutional content
in Flast v. Cohen . . . . By requiring a second, nonconstitutional step,
the Court comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement
that conditioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the challenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected
interests.224

Justice Brennan's reading of Flast finds some support in his quotation of
that case. The Flast majority had declared that " 'when standing is
placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue' and not [according to Justice Brennan] . . . whether on the
merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the defendant's
action invaded."225 FIast was not as clear, however, as Justice Brennan's
assertion made it seem. The Court's exclusion of the legally-protectedinterest test in Flast was implicit rather than explicit.
Nonetheless, Camp initiated two liberal trends in the standing area:
repudiation of the legally-protected-interest test in favor of the zone-ofinterest analysis, and Justice Brennan's strong assertion that the only appropriate inquiry was directed to injury-in-fact. Professor Davis regards
Camp as a watershed opinion.
In Data Processing. . . the Supreme Court unanimously superceded
a large batch of law [holding] . . . that something in the nature of a
"legal right" or 'legal interest" was necessary for standing. That shift is
a great accomplishment and it deserves strong emphasis, for federal law
of standing now has a new and better orientation. But that much is no

220. See supra notes 120-49, 193-212 and accompanying text.
221. 397 U.S. 159 (1970); see supra note 218.
222. Barlow, 397 U.S. at 167-68 (Brennan, J., concumng and dissenting).
223. Id. at 168-69 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
224. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted) (distinguishing Associated Indus. v. Ickes. 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943) (relying upon the legally protected interest
test)).
225. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., concumng and dissenting) (quoting mast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
99-100 (1968)).
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longer a live issue, for it has been fully resolved by a unanimous
The Court seemed to reaffirm its liberal movement two years later in
Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,227 in which residents of a
housing complex charged that the landlord had violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1968228by discriminating against nonwhite applicants. The lower
courts dismissed the complaint on the ground that only victims of discrimination had standing.229 A unanimous Court reversed, finding that
the statute defined an aggrieved person as one "who claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice."230 The Trajjcicante plaintiffs claimed to have suffered loss of social and business opportunities and
imposition of a stigma by being residents of a "white ghetto."231 The
Court found that these claims constituted injury-in-fact and that they
were sufficiently pleaded to establish the individualized
absent
in Sierra Club v. Morton.233 The Court also noted that Congress had
broadened the concept of "persons aggrieved," making them private attomeys general-a classification the Court regarded as "not uncommon
in modem legislative programs."234 Finally, the Court noted how broad
a concept of standing it was willing to consider, at least in civil rights
cases: "The person on the landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of
discriminatory housing practices; it is, as Senator Javits said in supporting the bill, 'the whole community.' "235
In Traficante, the Court implicitly propounded several notions
about standing. First, it reaffirmed the Camp view that injury-in-fact
might be noneconomic.236 Second, its reversal of the lower courts' dis226. Davis, supra note 21, at 457 (footnote omitted). Professor Davis' view that Camp settled
the issue, however, now appears to have been overly optimistic, at least in the fourth amendment
area, where the Court has sub silenrio returned to the old standard. See supra notes 179-92 and
accompanying text.
227. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
228. 42 U.S.C. $5 3601-3619 (1982).
229. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352,353 (N.D. Cal.), a f d , 446 F.2d
1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 205,208 (1972). The lower courts viewed the plaintifs as
asserting third-party rights, perhaps anticipating the Court's position in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975). See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 514.
230. 42 U.S.C. $ 3610(a) (1982).
231. Traficante, 409 U.S. at 208.
232. Id. at 209.
233. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
234. Traficanfe,409 U.S. at 21 1 (citing Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379,396 (1971); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,402
(1968); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). The applicability of the private-attorneygeneral concept to the problems of standing is discussed infra in notes 367-73 and accompanying
text.
235. Traficante, 409 U.S. at 21 1 (quoting 114 CONG.REC.2706 (1968)). The Court stated,
"We can give vitality to [the Act] only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all
in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute." Id. at 212.
236. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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missal implied that an individual might be injured for standing purposes
by unlawful conduct directed at someone else. Third, and most important, it explicitly recognized that a legislative enactment might consider
the whole community to be the benefited class, and that in such circumstances, members of the benefited community ought to have standing to
challenge a violation of the enactment.237
The Court expanded its consideration of standing related to alleged
noneconomic injury in United States v. SCRAP,238in which an environmental group challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission ruling
permitting railroads to levy a surcharge for transportation of recyclable
cornrn~dities.'~~
The plaintiff organization alleged that the ruling discouraged use of recyclable goods, and thus had an adverse impact on the
environment. Unlike the plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Morton,240 the
SCRAP plaintiff had pleaded a threat to its members' own enjoyment of
the en~ironment.'~' At the same time, the Court recognized that the
injury alleged in SCRAP was not nearly so limited in scope as that involved in Sierra Club.
But we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury. . . . To deny standing
to persons who are in fact injured, simply because many others are also
injured would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government
actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that
conclusion.242
Thus, the Court specifically acknowledged that the existence of widespread public noneconomic injury might suggest the absence of standing
under the rubric of "generalized grievances" mentioned in United States
v. R i ~ h a r d s o n .At
~ ~the
~ same time, the Court deliberately affirmed the
necessity of finding standing in such cases.
In Craig v. borer^,^^^ the Court went a step further in a case involv237. The Court reaffirmed the Traficante decision in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), again giving an extremely broad reading to the word "aggrieved" in Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. $9 3601-3619 (1982). In that case, the Court found
that members of the community, not themselves discriminated against, nevertheless had standing to
challenge Gladstone's actions, 441 U.S. at 111-15, and further noted that "[als we have said before,
'[tlhere can be no question about the importance' to a community of 'promoting stable, racially
integrated housing.' " Id. at 111 (quoting Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977)).
The importance of this observation to the concept of collective rights will be discussed infra in Part
111.
238. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
239. Id. at 672-78.
240. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
241. "Here, by contrast [with Sierra Club], the appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly
illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the natural resources of
the Washington Metropolitan Area." SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687.
242. Id. at 687-88.
243. 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974); see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
244. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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ing widespread injury to constitutional rights: it allowed a third party to
assert them. The plaintiffs challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males but not to females in the same age
group, charging that it constituted gender-based discrimination. The
case was brought by a male in the restricted age group and by a licensed
vendor of beer, but the Supreme Court heard the appeal only from the
vendor.245 The Court upheld the vendor's standing to sue, noting that
she clearly satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.246 The majority recognized, however, that on the merits, the vendor was relying upon an
equal protection claim based on unequal treatment of other people. With
respect to the nexus problem, the Court stated:
[Olur decisions have settled that limitations on a litigant's assertion ofjus
tertii are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary
"rule of self-restraint" designed to minimize unwarranted intervention
into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions are illdefined and speculative. . . . These prudential objectives, [generally]
thought to be enhanced by restrictions on third-party standing, cannot be
furthered here, where the lower court already has entertained the relevant constitutional challenge and the parties have sought--or at least
have never resisted-an authoritative constitutional determination. In
such circumstances, a decision by us to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits in order to await the initiation of a new challenge to the
statute by injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence. Moreover, insofar as the applicable constitutional questions have
been and continue to be presented vigorously and "cogently," . . the
denial ofjus tertii standing in deference to a direct class suit can serve no
functional purpose.247
Craig thus demonstrates the Court's recognition that there may be circumstances where third-party representation of constitutional rights is
appropriate, and reaffirms that problems with third-party standing are
not constitutionally based.248

.

245. Craig, the young male plaintiff, had exceeded the upper age limit of the affected group
following the Court's determination of probable jurisdiction of the appeal, mooting the case as to
him. Id. at 192 & n.2.
246. Id. at 194. In fact, the defendants conceded her standing. Id. at 193.
247. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
248. Craig was not a unanimous decision; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Only the Chief Justice's opinion mentioned the question of the vendor's standing. Justice Rehnquist,
who wrote exclusively on the merits, apparently acquiesced in the majority's treatment of the standing issue.
In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), a strong majority of the Court relied on
Craig and allowed vendors of contraceptive devices, on behalf of themselves and potential purchasers, to challenge a New York statute limiting access to and advertisement of contraceptives. Seven
members of the Court explicitly joined the portion of the Court's opinion allowing standing. Justice
Rehnquist, as in Craig, dissented on the merits without mentioning standing. The Chief Justice
dissented without explanation.
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In 1978, the Court clarified some of the limitations of the two-part
standing test. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, I ~ c .environmental
,~~'
groups and individuals challenged the
Price-Anderson
liability limitation for private developers of nuclear power plants. The defendants, the Duke Power Company and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, argued that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy either prong of the standing test. The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court found the plaintiffs' injury-in-fact in the "environmental and
aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution of the two lakes in the
vicinity of the disputed power plants."251 Certainly, the Court said, this
is "the type of harmful effect which has been deemed adequate in prior
cases to satisfy the 'injury in fact' ~tandard."'~' Apart from the plaintiffs' fear of nuclear accidents, therefore, the Court found their allegations of injury sufficiently nonspeculative to justify standing.
The Court flatly repudiated the nexus test's applicability to cases
other than taxpayer suits. "We . . . cannot accept the contention that,
outside the context of taxpayers' suits, a litigant must demonstrate something more than injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury to satisfy
the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art. III."253 The Court went on
to state explicitly that the other limitations on standing were prudential
only, referring specifically to its concerns about the proper role of the
courts in American
its rejection of the courts as a forum for
airing generalized grievances,255and its limited approach to third-party
standing.256 The Court noted: "Where a party champions his own
rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one
which will be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic
practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are
generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met."257 Thus,
the Court seemed almost to merge its prudential concerns into the constitutionally based injury-in-fact requirement, at least for some purposes.
To the extent that this occurred, it clearly indicated a liberalization of the
249. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
250. 42 U.S.C. 5 2210 (1982).
251. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 73.
252. Id. at 73-74 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
253. Id. at 79 (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 80 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)).
255. Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
256. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17
(1960)).
257. Id. at 80-81 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977)).
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Court's view on standing.258
The Court's approach to standing throughout the past fifteen years
has clearly been inconsistent.259 The apparently liberal trend of the
Court in Camp, SCRAP, Craig, Carey, and Duke Power led to expansions in the concept of injury-in-fact and the availability of third-party
standing, as well as a corresponding limitation of the prudentially based
nexus test as a restrictive factor in standing. At the same time, in Sierra
Club, the Court took an extremely restrictive approach to the requirements for proper1.y pleading injury-in-fact. Moreover, the Court clearly
refused to recognize that any taxpayer or citizen (or, one supposes, all of
them260)might have a sufficient particularized interest in lawful government conduct to give rise to injury-in-fact when government acts unlawAnd in Warth v. SeIdin,262 the Court took an extremely
restrictive view of both injury-in-fact and third-party standing, refusing
to reach the substantive
while insisting on a degree of pleading
exactitude and third-party interest not seen prior to that time and certainly inconsistent with its decision a year later in Craig. Finally, in Valley Forge, the Court made clear its hostility to citizen claims of unlawful
government conduct unless such claimants were able to show some injury more concrete than damage to their interest in having government
abide by the social compact.264

C. Problems with the Current Standing Model
Wholly apart from the inconsistencies in the Court's positions on
standing, the majority's increasingly restrictive view of standing poses
258. The Duke Power Court's view of standing was not unanimous. Justice Stewart, concurring
in the result, questioned whether the plaintiffs had shown sufficient injury-in-fact to cross the constitutional threshold. Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
259. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 27, and the authorities cited at 68 n.3.
260. See infra Part 11, Section C.
261. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see also supra notes 120-49 and accompanying text.
262. 422 U.S.490 (1975); see supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
263. Indeed, Justices Douglas and Brennan attributed the Court's decision to something less
than dispassionate judicial reasoning. "With all respect, I think that the Court reads the complaint
and the record with antagonistic eyes." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
[ l h e opinion, which tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who
could be injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only by an
indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits. I can appreciate the Court's reluctance to
But courts cannot readjudicate the complex and difficult legal questions involved .
fuse to hear a case on the merits merely because they would prefer not to, and it is quite
clear, when the record is viewed with dispassion, that at least three of the groups of plaintiffs have made allegations, and supported them with affidavits and documentary evidence,
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Id. at 520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.

. ..
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substantial problems for a nation that, on the Lockean model, proceeds
on the basis that government results from a social compact and is the
trustee of the powers settled upon it by the citizens whose consent gives it
legitimacy. Many of the problems can be illustrated by extensions of
some of the Court's recent standing cases themselves. For example, suppose that Congress passed a joint resolution declaring that the legislative
branch could not properly consider the military budget unless each of its
members became a general or admiral in the armed forces. Suppose further that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, acceded to the request
and commissioned each member. The nation would then be faced with a
wholesale, deliberate violation, by Congress and the President, of the incompatability
Yet under the rationale of Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,266 no judicial remedy would exist
because no one would have standing. Indeed, this hypothetical merely
confirms the recognition by the Schlesinger Court that the judicial system
provides no remedy for certain types of governmental conduct that violate the C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ ~
Cases like Valley Forge 268 present similar problems. Assuming that
the conveyance to Valley Forge Christian College constituted a prohibited establishment of religion, one may legitimately ask who would have
had standing to challenge it. Taxpayer standing was ruled out as a basis,269as was citizen standing,270and the Court explicitly recognized that
this created a situation where no conceivable plaintiff could have standing.271 Taken to its logical extreme, the reasoning of Valley Forge can,
like Schlesinger, lead to utterly absurd results. Suppose Congress conveyed Fort Hood, Texas, to a fundamentalist religious group so that it
could establish a center of religious worship. Clearly such a transfer
would violate the establishment clause;272yet under the rationale of Valley Forge, no one would have standing to seek judicial redress.
In fact, many establishment clause cases raise standing problems
under the Valley Forge rationale, problems ordinarily ignored by the
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 6, cl. 2.
266. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
267. Schlesitlger, 418 U.S. at 227.
268. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
271. See supra text accompanying note 203.
272. U.S. CONST.amend. I; see, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1973) (invalidating state funding for maintenance and repair of sectarian
schools, tuition grants for private school attendance, and tuition tax credits); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971) (upholding federal construction grants to private postsecondary educational institutions only to the extent the funds were used for nonsectarian facilities); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (invalidating state salary supplement for teachers in private
schools).
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courts deciding such cases. For example, in Zorach v. C l a ~ s o n the
,~~~
plaintiffs challenged a New York program involving released time for
public school students to attend religious instruction. The instruction
program was not on school premises and received no state financial support, direct or indirect.274 The Supreme Court upheld the program without any mention of standing. Yet, viewed in terms of Valley Forge, it is
difficult to pinpoint any injury-in-fact to the plaintiffs, whose children
remained in the secular schools for instruction during the released time
period, other than some injury to their "spiritual stake" in the abstract
concept of separation of church and state.275 Similarly, in Board of Education v.
a case challenging a New York program to lend textbooks to religious schools for instruction in secular subjects, the Court
also proceeded to the merits without any mention of standing.277
Possible cases of government lawlessness in which no one would
have standing are not limited either to establishment clause cases or to
situations like those in Richardson or Schlesinger. Indeed, the Court's
insistence that "generalized grievances" cannot be the basis for standing278raises the spectre of all sorts of abuses by government where no
Clearly, the
one would have standing to seek judicial inter~ention.'~~
prospect of a standing doctrine so restrictive as to prohibit the courts
from restraining even the grossest types of governmental misconduct is
not an enticing one. Yet the Court has warned that recognition of a
substantially broader standing doctrine, or one based on an altered concept of injury-in-fact, would eviscerate the constitutional requirements
relating to standing.280 But the Court's response to the article I11 prob273. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
274. In this respect, the program differed from the program the Court invalidated in Illinois ex
re!. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
275. This interest was noted by the Court in dictum in Association of Data Processing Scrv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). See supra note 219 and accon~panyingtext.
276. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
277. This is not to suggest that the plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate injury-in-fact in any
establishment clause case. For example, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the plaintiff
challenged Sunday closing laws. Traditional injury-in-fact was easily demonstrated; enforcement of
the laws resulted in plaintiffs loss of revenue from either closing on Sundays or paying fines for being
open. Id. at 430-31;see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 120-27 (1982) (plaintiff had
standing to challenge Massachusetts law permitting churches to veto issuance of liquor licenses to
establishments within 500 feet).
278. See supra notes 120-41, 201-03 and accompanying text.
279. For example, in the early 1970's, it was rumored that then Vice President Spiro Agnew had
32-33 (1976). Supdiscussed suspending the 1972 general elections. See J. DEAN,BLINDAMBITION
pose that the Nixon administration had done so, using national security as a pretext to attempt to
remain in office. Taking the Court's analysis to its logical extreme, no one would have standing to
challenge the suspension except, perhaps, persons who could make a sufficiently concrete showing
that they would have been candidates in those elections. Everyone else's interest would have been
indistinguishable in character from the plaintiffs' interest in Valley Forge or Scltlesit~ger.
280. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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lem does not follow ineluctably from this premise. In the next Part, this
Article proposes a new approach to "stake in the outcome" which leads
to a broader, yet still manageable, standing doctrine consistent with our
philosophical history.

I11
COLLECTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTSAND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE DOCTRINE
OF STANDING
The Court's approach to standing has been inconsistent in two important ways. First, the Justices have not settled on a single concept of
injury-in-fact, with reference to how individualized or generalized it must
be.281 Second, they have inconsistently applied the nexus test, relying
heavily upon it in fourth amendment cases282while refusing even to acknowledge it as part of standing doctrine in other than taxpayer
This Part of the Article explores a new approach to standing that eliminates the inconsistencies in current standing doctrine and permits suits
involving serious governmental trespasses that currently appear immune
from judicial remedy.284
This Part first sets out an additional kind of interest in constitutional
cases, supplying a new predicate for the constitutionally required "stake
in the outcome":285 collective rights. Second, the compatibility of a collective stake in the outcome with our Lockean constitutional heritage is
demonstrated. Third, areas where collective rights have already been or
ought to be recognized are noted and discussed. Finally, this Part proposes a new theory of standing in constitutional cases that is consistent
with the foregoing analysis yet does not create universal standing.

A.

The Interest To Be Protected and the Lockean Model

The classic statement of the case-or-controversy requirement in the
area of standing is that plaintiffs must have "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional quest i o n ~ . "The
~ ~ difficulty,
~
of course, has occurred in applying the concept
of "a personal stake in the outcome" to particular fact patterns. The
281. Compare Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972) with
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974). See also supra notes 128, 227-37 and
accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
283. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978); see
also supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
284. See supra pp. 92-94.
285. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
286. Id.
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Court insists that if an individual's interest in a controversy is undifferentiated from the rest of the citizenry's, he has not demonstrated a sufficient personal stake in the outcome.287But this doctrinal approach leads
to an anomaly: if government broadly and nonspecifically violates the
Constitution, no individual has a sufficient stake in the outcome to pursue a judicial remedy. In short, the Court tells us that, for purposes of
standing, no one has a sufficient stake to keep government behavior
within constitutional limits.
In a Lockean society, this is the ultimate contradiction. The citizenry's compact and consent create the government and give it legitimacy. Citizens' inability to challenge actions that violate the charter of
It becomes
government's existence make the charter unenfor~eable.~~~
the constitutional analog of the unenforceable contract that declares, "I
will if I want to."289 In fact, however, the Lockean model provides a
solution to the dilemma. Because the society creates the government,
and because the government is responsible to its creator-not as one contracting party to another but rather as trustee to settlorZg0or agent to
principal2g1-there is a clear collective societal interest in having the government behave in strict accord with the Constitution. When government violates the Constitution, the stake in the outcome of the
controversy is society's stake, and is the most fundamental interest possible: the interest in government functioning as agreed upon by its
creators.
The collective interest concept is certainly not new, as Part I demonstrates. Locke conceived of the civil state as one in which government is
responsible to society as a whole, rather than to any particular individual.292 That concept was echoed in the Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n ~ e ~ ~ ~
and subsequent American
Both legal relationships suggested
287. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S.464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); supra notes 120-58, 193-213 and accompanying text.
288. The only possible enforcement mechanism is the electoral process, but that is ill-suited to
resolution of constitutional questions. See infra notes 312-21 and accompanying text.
Professor Nichol has noted that the Court's approach to standing in cases like Valley Forgc
means that the Constitution cannot always be enforced. "The Court
views some constitutional
provisions as enforceable and others not." Nichol, supra note 27, at 92.
289. In the law of contracts this is referred to as an illusory promise. "Such on illusory promise
is neither enforceable against the one making it, nor is it operative as a condition for a return promise." Corbin, The Eflect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALEL.J. 571, 574 (1925) (footnote
omitted).
290. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 70.
292. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
293. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
294. For example, James Madison specifically spoke of "the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community," THE FEDERALISTNO. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), in arguing

...
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by the Lockean model of civil society connote collective rights. First, the
people whose consent gives rise to government may be regarded as a
principal, and government as the agent.295 The agency is created by the
people acting as a collective unit, not by any individual; hence the responsibility of the governmental agent is to the collective principal. Second, Locke spoke of government as a trustee of powers given to it by the
people,296and the people thus become both the settlors and the beneficiaries of the governmental
Two analogies from the law of frusts demonstrate these relationships. The beneficiaries of a trust have standing to challenge the malfeasance of the trustee, though the beneficiary must show that the trustee's
conduct has harmed the beneficiary's interest under the trust.298 The law
of standing in the trust area, therefore, appears to parallel the Supreme
Court's injury-in-fact analysis in constitutional adjudication. The
Supreme Court has failed to recognize, however, that under the American constitutional model, the beneficiary's interest is the performance of
the governmental trustee, not the receipt of more tangible benefits. The
settlor of a trust for public benefit also has standing to challenge the misbehavior of his trustee if the settlor retains a beneficial interest in the
performance of the trust.299 In this respect, Locke's trust metaphor suggests a different concept of standing in constitutional cases, one that recognizes the citizenry as the source of the fiduciary power lodged in
government. When a trustee violates the terms of the trust, the settlors
and beneficiaries have standing to enforce the terms of the trust through
the courts. Why should not the same be true when the governmental
trustee violates the terms of the trust expressed in the Constitution?
Of course, one of the terms of this governmental trust is that judicial
challenges may be raised only within the limits of the trust agreementthe Constitution. However, the Constitution requires only that a case or
controversy exist for the judicial power of the United States to be exercised. It is the Supreme Court that has interpreted the case-or-controversy clause as requiring the individual plaintiff to have a stake in the
outcome,300insisted that such a stake can be demonstrated only by plaintiffs injury-in-fa~t,~OI
and declared that the government's violation of the
for a republican form of government that could "break and control the violence of faction." Id. at
77. Two years later he commented on "the general principle, that laws are unconstitutional, which
infringe the rights of the community." 1 ANNALSOF CONG.458 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
295. See supra note 70.
296. See supra notes 48-50, 57-61 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
298. A. Scorr,THELAWOF TRUSTS
$5 199.1-.3 (3d ed. 1967).
299. Id. $ 200.1.
300. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.186, 204 (1962).
301. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
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Constitution, without more, can never give rise to the sort of injury that
satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement.302 The Court's belittling
references to "generalized grievances" imply that government's obedience to the Constitution is too meager an interest to deserve judicial
attention. In fact, in a society based on the Lockean model, there can
hardly be a greater interest, or one more worthy of judicial attention.
The question whether the government has complied with the Constitution goes to the civil society's continuing right to exist as an organized
unit.303
One must remember that society, acting as a unit, creates the government. No individual, standing alone, may properly be regarded as the
settlor of the governmental trust. As Locke made clear in discussing
society's formation and dissolution, it is the collective body of society
that stands in direct relationship to government. For example, recall
Locke's description of the two-step process that forms civil society: first,
individuals combine into a society, and second, the community vests its
power in government as a
Similarly, the right retained by society to dissolve itself and to do away with civil government-the Lockean
right of revolution-is also collective.305 Thus, the interest in government's proper performance is primarily collective306 because of the
processes of government formation and dissolution. To the extent the
judiciary regulates government on behalf of the people, the scope of adjudication should be affected by the collective model of society upon which
the nation is established.
The Supreme Court has not been blind to this sort of collective interest. On occasion, the Court has specifically recognized it. In United
States v. Richard~on,~~'
the Court admitted that its developing standing
doctrine might create circumstances in which no one would have standing to sue. It did not, however, regard that as a problem with its doctrine; rather, it viewed that situation as supporting its argument that such
controversies should be remitted to the political process for resolution.308
[Tlhat the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of
course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the
302. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,4?8-90 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 226-27 (1974).
303. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
306. That is not to say, of course, that there is no individual interest in proper government
functioning. Locke recognized such interests when he described government as existing to protect
individuals' property rights, J. LOCKE,supra note 23, 5 138, at 378-79, and the American Bill of
Rights was also designed in part to enhance individual interests.
307. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
308. Id. at 179; see also supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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"ground rules" established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of
the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of
Art. I11 jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the
political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive
though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that
elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to
them.309

Similarly, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
~ OCourt reiterated that "even
Separation of Church and State, I ~ c . , ~the
when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the
requirements of Art. 111, the Court has refrained from adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized
grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
representative branches."311Thus, the Court relied upon what it characterized as a "slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive" process for vindication of rights sufficiently significant to merit specific constitutional
mention.
There are four shortcomings in the majority's reliance on the political process to correct constitutional violations. First, as the Court itself
has recognized, the political process is notoriously slow. Moreover, it is
particularly unresponsive to single-issue candidacies, especially at the national
The more diverse the electorate and the more complicated the issue facing it, the less any single issue is likely to be dispositive
in the electoral
Second, the Court in effect makes constitutional decisions a matter
309. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. The Court did not explain why its treatment of standing in
Richardson compels the conclusion that such disputes should be handled politically.
310. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
31 1. 454 U.S. at 474-75 (emphasis added) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500
(1975)).
312. See Jaffe, supra note 27, at 1286-87 ("Formal majorities register judgments only occasionally, and then as a rule not on specific issues but on total performance."). The phenomenon Professor Jaffe refers to is merely a general reflection of American voting patterns. "The role that any
specific issue may play in ultimate partisan choice is limited in several directions. Only rarely does a
single policy belief comprise the sole force in the psychological field as the voting decision is made."
A. CAMPBELL,
P. CONVERSE,W. MILLER& D. STOKES,THE AMERICANVOTER97-98 (abr. ed.
1964).
313. The Third Circuit has noted the difficulties of the political process in the context of broadening standing: "Mnless individuals avemng an encroachment of their legal rights have some recourse other than the political process for the vindication and protection of those rights, the proud
claim that individual citizens have rights against the government may be emptied of significance."
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'dsub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.464 (1982).
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of majority vote.314 The Court not only remits certain constitutional
questions to the political process for resolution, but it also implicitly declares that the answers are not to be found in the Constitution itself.
Rather, they are to be determined by the electoral process-a process
against which the Constitution was to provide some insulation.315 For
example, in Valley Forge, the majority would apparently have the constitutionality of the conveyance be an issue in the next national election,
after which, by tallying the vote, one would know whether the conveyance did or did not violate the establishment clause. To the extent that
this is the Court's implicit suggestion, it prescribes a form of constitutional relativism that poses substantial difficulties; stare decisis may be
less than immutable, but its mood swings certainly cannot compare with
those of the American electorate.
The third problem stems from the limitations of the electoral process. Many constitutional questions avoided by the Court on standing
grounds cannot be resolved by the electorate, no matter how speedy, consistent, and rational its behavior. For example, in Exparte L e ~ i t t , the
~'~
plaintiff argued that Justice Black's appointment to the Supreme Court
violated the ineligibility clause.317 The political process provided no possible remedy for the allegedly unlawful actions of the President and the
Senate that had placed Justice Black on the Court. Federal judges are
not subject to recall; they can be removed from office only by impeachment, and then only for conduct not amounting to "good
Thus, the allegedly unconstitutional appointment was immune to electoral correction. Similarly, there is no apparent political remedy for the
conveyance of federal land to Valley Forge Christian College. Even if
the electorate were to unite to vote out of office those responsible for the
conveyance, that would provide no mechanism by which to set the con314. The Court has previously made a similar suggestion in the fourth amendment context by
leaving to the states the question of whether to adopt the exclusionary rule. In Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128 (1954), the Court declined to reverse the holding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule had no application to the states, though they were bound by the fourth amendment through the 14th amendment.
The plurality in Irvine explained that "to upset state convictions even before the states have had
adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the rule would be an unwarranted use of federal power,"
347 U.S. at 134 (Jackson, J.). The Court did not explain why state courts' use of evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment should become more or less constitutional according to how
many states repudiated the practice, nor did it explain how, if the rule were not constitutionally
required, the Supreme Court would have any basis for imposing it on the states.
315. Indeed, James Madison noted at some length that the then-proposed Constitution was
structured to prevent, to the extent possible, tyrannies of the majority. THEFEDERALIST
NO. 51 (J.
Madison); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (specifically recognizing that the first amendment was intended to limit such tyrannies).
316. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam); see supra note 129.
317. U.S. CONST.art. I, 96, cl. 2.
318. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 8 1.
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veyance aside.319 It is, therefore, a bit too facile for the Court to assert,
, ~ ~questions
~
that the federal courts refuse to
as it did in R i ~ h a r d s o nthat
address on standing grounds may be resolved through the political
The fourth problem concerns the role of the federal courts in the
constitutional system. Since Marbury v. Madison,322the established principle has been that the responsibility for evaluating the constitutionality
of congressional and executive actions is lodged in the judiciary.323 Even
before the Constitution was adopted, James Madison recognized the judiciary's role in restraining government,324and the Supreme Court itself
has been unequivocal in its support of this quintessentially judicial function. "[Ilt is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction
of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the
Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the
14th Amendment forbids the State to do.''325 The Burger Court has recognized that under the Constitution, "the judiciary is clearly discernible
as the primary means through which [constitutional] rights may be enThe Court's assertion, therefore, that the judiciary must yield
to the political process when certain constitutional questions arise is in319. Indeed, once title became vested in the college, an argument could be made that a subsequent attempt to legislatively undo the conveyance would constitute a taking without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment.
320. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
321. That is not to say that no problem presented in a standing case is addressable in the electoral forum. It certainly is true that, upon rejection of his plea in the courts for a declaration that
the Central Intelligence Agency Act was unconstitutional, Richardson could have mounted a nationwide campaign to elect a Congress and, if necessary, a President who would effect a repeal of the
challenged statute. Some, of course, might view this as impractical. See supra notes 312-13 and
accompanying text.
322. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
323. See id.; accord United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (power to review intrabranch
dispute between President and special prosecutor); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.486 (1969)
(power to review congressional decision whether to seat a duly elected Member of Congress);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (power to review exercise of congressional power to
punish uncooperative witnesses).
324. Justice Brennan tried unsuccessfully to bring this part of American history to the Court's
attention:
As James Madison noted, if a bill of rights were "incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights."
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S.464, 494 n.6 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 ANNALSOF CONG.439 (J. Gales ed.
1789)).
325. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted) (jurisdiction over claim for damages suffered from federal agents' violation of fourth and fifth amendment rights).
326. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (implied cause of action for due process
violation).
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consistent with its own stated view of its role in the constitutional
system.327
Thus, although the Court recognizes the collective interest in restraining government within the confines of the constitution, it generally
characterizes that interest as insufficient to give rise to a case or controversy within the meaning of article III.328Yet in several areas, the Court
has recognized collective rights as part of the constitutional structure,
and several Justices frequently speak of rights and remedies in collective
terms.

B.

The Court's Recognition of Collective Rights

Explicitly or implicitly, the Supreme Court329has identified collective rights in the first, second, fourth, sixth and thirteenth amendm e n t ~as, ~well
~ ~as in some of the provisions of article I.331In the first
amendment area, the collective interest has manifested itself in two ways.
First, the Court has clearly demonstrated its recognition of collective interests in public and press access to judicial proceedings. For example, in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,332the Court specifically noted "a
guaranteed right of the public under the First and Fourteenth Amend327. Chief Justice Marshall might have viewed the Court's current position more harshly, in
light of his assertion in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), that for the Court to
refuse to exercise power conferred on it by the Constitution is "treason to the Constitution." Id, at
403. And, as Justice (later Chief Justice) Charles Evans Hughes said, "We are under a Constitution,
but the Constitution is what the judges say it is . . ." D. PERKINS,CHARLESEVANSHUGHES
AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC
STATESMANSHIP
16 (1956).
328. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); supra notes 120-53 and accompanying text.
329. One of the most vocal members of the Court in invoking community imagery is Chief
Justice Burger, who argues that the community's collective interest must be given greater weight
when balanced against the individual's than has heretofore been the case. But while he adopts the
concept of community, the Chief Justice seems to apply it far more to limit assertion of individual
constitutional rights than to aid in restricting unlawful governmental actions. See generally Chesler,
Imagery of Community, Ideology of Authority: The Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18
HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457 (1983).
330. In addition, Justice Marshall made fleeting reference to a "social interest in preserving
[fifth amendment] liberties and in the integrity of the criminal justice system" in Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 254 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting), but neither he nor the Court has
pursued this idea.
331. Both Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), and United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), characterized the plaintiffs' interests under the ineligibility clause and the accounts clause as no more than generalized grievances, implicitly placing these
constitutional provisions in the realm of collective, not individual, interests. A similar argument
may be made with respect to Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam).
332. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Richmond Newspapers involved a press challenge to a Virginia trial
court order closing a defendant's fourth murder trial to the press at the request of defense counsel.
The press' motion to vacate the closure order was denied. The Supreme Court had held a year
earlier that there was no public sixth amendment right to attend preliminary court proceedings
in criminal cases. Gannett Co. v. DePasquaie, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). By contrast, Riclltnond
Newspapers presented the issue whether the first amendment allowed closure of criminal trials. The

.
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ments to attend the
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, explored the nature of the public right at greater length and argued
for more explicit recognition under the first amendment of such a public
right to receive information.334 In these respects, Richmond Newspapers
echoed dicta from earlier cases that suggested recognition of a public
constitutional right.335 Thus, the Court has clearly recognized an interest held by the public under the first amendment to attend criminal
trials.336
Individual Justices have also argued on the basis of collective first
amendment rights. For example, Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas, dissented in Barenblatt v. United States,337
a decision that affirmed a contempt of Congress conviction entered
against a teacher who refused to answer questions of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee. Justice Black specifically referred to
"the interest of the people in having [first amendment rights] exer~ i s e d . " Later
~ ~ ~ in the same opinion, he sharply criticized the majority's
approach:
[The Court] balances the right of the Government to preserve itself,
against Barenblatt's right to refrain from revealing Communist affiliations. Such a balance, however, mistakes the factors to be weighed . . .
[and] completely leaves out the real interest in Barenblatt's silence, the
interest of the people as a whole in being able to join organizations, advocate causes and make political "mistakes" without later being subjected
to governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves. . . .
It is these interests of society, rather than Barenblatt's own right to siCourt declined to extend Gannett, but explicitly based its holding on the first, rather than the sixth
amendment.
One remarkable aspect of Richmond Newspapers is its unarticulated assumption of the petitioner's standing where the interest invoked was no less undifferentiated from that of the general
citizenry than that in Valley Forge. See infra notes 388-92, 396-97 and accompanying text.
333. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. Though the Chief Justice's opinion was only for a
plurality of the Court, this aspect of it was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens. Accord Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982)
("Richmond Newspapers firmly established . . that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. . . [Sleven Justices recognized that this right of access is
embodied in the First Amendment, and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983) (access to pretrial criminal
proceedings, specifically bail reduction hearing); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir.
1982) (access to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings).
334. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585-98 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also
id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
335. E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,541 (1965) ("[Tlhe public has the right to be informed as
to what occurs in its courts . . . ."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public
event. What transpires in the court room is public property.").
336. The Third Circuit recently recognized that the public and press have a first amendment
right of access to civil proceedings as well. Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
337. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
338. Id. at 143 (Black. J.. dissenting).

.

.
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lence, which I think the Court should put on the balance against the
demands of the Government, if any balancing process is to be
tolerated.339
Thus, the three Justices recognized both the existence of a cognizable
collective interest in the first amendment and the importance of considering the possible antagonism between the collective, societal interest and
the government's interest. The collective interest not only exists as a
constitutional concept, but also requires protection from the government
itself; the government cannot be assumed to represent it.340
The Court's recognition of collective rights in the first amendment
area has not been limited to questions of public access to courts. In
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC341 and FCC v. Sanders Brothers
Radio Station,342which concerned disputes over FCC licenses to operate
radio stations, the Court expressly recognized the status of radio stations
as representatives of the public interest. In Scripps-Howard, the petitioner contested a modification of a competitor's license. In reviewing
the petitioner's standing, the Court noted that the Communications Act
of 1934343was designed to protect "the public interest in communicat i o n ~ . "The
~ ~ Act
~ conferred a right of appeal on aggrieved persons, but
the Court noted the limitations of that right. "[Tlhese private litigants
have standing only as representatives of the public interest.
That a
court is called upon to enforce public rights and not the interests of private property does not diminish its power to protect such rights."345
Thus, the Court recognized that Congress had created a statutory collective right in this area because of communication's public importance.
Regarding the second amendment, courts have been even clearer
about the nature of the right guaranteed. Case after case has considered
whether the right to bear arms is an individual or a collective right. The
Sixth Circuit, for example, stated unequivocally that "lilt is clear that the
Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual
right,"346 a view apparently reflected by every court to have considered

...

339. Id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting).
340. See also Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972) (public interests in
the first amendment may be more important than personal interests).
341. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
342. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
343. 47 U.S.C. 98 i51-610 (1982).
344. Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S.at 14.
345. Id. at 14-15 (citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,477 (1940); National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940)). The Court's remarkable position that the petitioner
had standing not as a private entity but only as a public representative stands in stark contrast to the
Court's more common assertion that to represent the public interest a litigant must demonstrate a
private right. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see supra notes 114-16 and
accompanying text. This apparently lenient position might be thought to result in part from the
holding's statutory, rather than constitutional, basis. Bur see infra note 365.
346. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cerr. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
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the issue ~pecifically.~~'
The courts have adopted this position because of
the introductory phrase of the second amendment, referring to the right
to bear arms in the context of maintenance of a militia.348 Nonetheless,
it is significant that the courts have explicitly recognized that the Framers of the Constitution intended to create at least one collective right. It
is also noteworthy that this recognition came in consideration of an
amendment that speaks of rights held by a plural entity, the people,
rather than by an individual. Compare the rights of "the people" referred to in the first, second, fourth, ninth, and tenth amendments with
those of "the person" and "the accused" safeguarded in the fifth and
sixth amendments. The second amendment joins the first as a provision
in which collective rights have received a judicial imprimatur.
In the fourth amendment area, the Supreme Court has been less
forthright about recognizing collective interests, but it has nevertheless
done so in cases considering application of the exclusionary rule.
Through the 197OYs,the Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule exists to protect the collective, societal interest in deterring fourth amendment violations, and not to make whole the victim of an unlawful search
or seizure.349 Moreover, the Court used that societal interest concept as
a predicate for refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in cases where the
individual would have benefited by its application but the deterrent effect-the benefit to society generally-would have been more tenuous.350
The collective interest is, therefore, now clearly recognized in the fourth
amendment area, though in the cases where the court has commented
347. Eg., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d
261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on othergrounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d
521 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939). But see Levine & Saxe, The Second Amendment: The Right To Bear Arms, 7 Hous. L. REV.
1 (1969) (suggesting that the second amendment guarantee is individual as well as collective).
348. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
349. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974):
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search
victim: "[Tlhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late." Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
Id. at 347-48 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)); accord United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976).
A contrary suggestion appears in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S.219 (1968), which mentions that one of the exclusionary rule's benefits is that it "restores the situation that would have
prevailed if the Government had itself obeyed the law." Id. at 224 n.lO. Harrison has not been
followed.
350. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 349-52 (1974).

.
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upon the societal interest, it has used that interest as a reason for refusing
to punish unconstitutional government behavior. Despite that unusual
twist, this development of fourth amendment jurisprudence is important
because of the emergence of the collective interest analysis.351
The collective, public interest in the fourth amendment was specifically mentioned in Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. White.352
[Tlhe issue here is whether to interpose a search warrant procedure between law enforcement agencies engaging in electronic eavesdropping
and the public generally. By casting its "risk analysis" solely in terms of
the expectations and risks that "wrongdoers" or "one contemplating illegal activities" ought to bear, the plurality opinion, I think, misses the
mark entirely. [By not requiring warrants to eavesdrop, the Court] does
not simply mandate that criminals must daily run the risk of unknown
eavesdroppers prying into their private affairs; it subjects each and every
law-abiding member of society to that risk.353

It was the public interest that Justice Harlan felt had been given insufficient consideration by the White plurality. But because White was written in Justice Harlan's last year on the bench, it is impossible to tell
whether his collective-interest interpretation w h l d have swayed other
members of the Court in the 1970's standing cases had he been there to
urge it.354
The Court has also implicitly recognized a public interest in the
sixth amendment guarantee of a jury trial in all criminal cases.355 Some
defendants, however, prefer to be tried to the court. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure permit a defendant to waive a jury and be tried to
the court, provided the judge and prosecutor agree.356 In Singer v.
United States,357the Supreme Court upheld this restriction on the waiver
of a jury trial. The Singer Court did not discuss why the waiver limita351. For a detailed argument in favor of recognition of a collective fourth amendment right, see
Doernberg, supra note 29.
352. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Justice Harlan opposed reaffirmation of the Court's rule permitting
warrantless electronic eavesdropping with the consent of any party to a conversation. That rule had
been adopted by the Court in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). The Court had occasion
in White to reconsider On Lee because the Seventh Circuit had reversed White's narcotics conviction
on the ground that On Lee had been overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz
had ruled that wiretapping or eavesdropping could constitute a fourth amendment violation despite
the absence of physical trespass into an area in which the search victim had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. In White, the Court declined to extend Katz to the situation where one of the parties to a
conversation has consented to the electronic intrusion.
353. White, 401 U.S. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 179-92.
355. The Supreme Court now reads the word "all" in the sixth amendment to mean "somc,"
permitting a nonjury trial over the defendant's objection where the offense charged is "petty": i.e.
carries a possible penalty of less than six months imprisonment. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 69 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
356. FED. R. CRIM.P. 23(a).
357. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
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tion had been instituted, but at least one reason may be inferred from the
opinion. The Court noted that "[tlrial by jury has been established by
the Constitution as the 'normal and . . . preferable mode of disposing of
issues of fact in criminal cases.' "358 But to whom is this mode of adjudication preferable? The preference is obviously not the defendant's, since
Singer sought to waive the jury trial. The Singer Court's statement must
reflect, therefore, the existence of an unarticulated public interest in the
sixth amendment right to jury
The thirteenth amendment360also indirectly implicates collective
rights. Titles VIII and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,361which concern fair housing practices, were enacted as enforcement measures in order to eliminate one of the remaining badges of slavery in American
In both Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood 363 and
Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance C O . ,the
~ ~Supreme
~
Court explicitly noted the community interest embodied in the Act and seized
upon congressional recognition of that interest as a reason to find standing for plaintiffs against whom there had been no discriminatory action.
Such plaintiffs' interest in integrated community living surely was undifferentiated from anyone else's similar interest; yet the Court, affirming
the community interest, found standing.365 This is significant for two
reasons. First, it acknowledges another judicially cognizable collective
right-a thirteenth amendment right to reside in a community the composition of which is not determined by race. Second, it casts grave doubt
on the Court's repeated assertions366that generalized grievances-those
shared by the community at large--cannot meet the requirements of the
case-or-controversy provision. If that were so, congressional recognition
of such interests would do nothing to alter or satisfy the constitutional
minima. Gladstone and Traficante are the Court's implicit recognition
358. Id. at 35 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.276, 312 (1930)).
359. The rule might be seen merely as an attempt to ensure that defendants' waivers of this
constitutional right are knowing and intelligent within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). But such paternalism would be anomalous given that other constitutional rights under
the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments may be waived unilaterally.
360. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
361. 42 U.S.C. $5 3601-3619, 3631 (1982).
362. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974);
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
363. 441 U.S.91 (1979).
364. 409 U.S.205 (1972); see supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
365. The fact that a statute explicitly provided standing is unimportant. If undifferentiability of
the plaintiffs injury from the injury suffered by the public generally meant that no case or controversy existed, as the Court suggested in Schlesinger and Richardson, then the congressional attempt
to grant standing through the statute would be ineffective. It is the nature of the interest asserted
vis-a-vis the Constitution that is important, not the source from which the interest springs.
366. See supra notes 137-41, 201-03 and accompanying text.
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that the community can have a stake in the outcome sufficient to have its
interest represented by one of its members without running afoul of article 111.
There are, in addition, two procedural analogs to the substantive
collective rights that the courts have recognized. Generalized interests
have been vindicated in the courts by representatives from the private
and public sectors. When such representation is by a private individual,
the courts refer to him as a private attorney general. When the public
sector is involved in the representation, the concept of parens patriae is
employed.
Private attorneys general have been explicitly recognized in a variety
of contexts. For example, in Newman v. Piggie Park enterprise^,^^^ the
Court specifically approved of individuals acting as private attorneys
general to enforce provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.368 The
private attorney general theory was also used in Traficante v. Metropoli~ ' respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1968,370
tan Life Insurance C O . , ~with
and it has been used to enforce the 1965 Voting Rights
and the
Social Security
It appears, however, that plaintiffs have never
been accorded standing as private attorneys general in constitutional
cases.373 Nonetheless, the concept of collective interest clearly inheres in
the concept of private attorneys general, and it would be difficult to argue
that policies more important than those contained in the Constitution
exist.
Parens patriae involves state action on behalf of its citizens pursuant
to its duty to safeguard the general welfare of the people. The Supreme
In Georgia v.
Court has accepted the principle of parens patriae
Pennsylvania Railroad,375the Court permitted the state to bring a parens
367. 390 U.S.400 (1968) (per curiam).
368. 42 U.S.C. $8 2000a to a-6 (1982) (as amended).
369. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
370. 42 U.S.C. $8 3601-3619, 3631 (1982) (as amended).
371. Id. $5 1971, 1973 to 1973b-4 (as amended); see Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969).
372. 42 U.S.C.A. 48 301-1397f (West 1983); see National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
373. In United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980), the Court analogized
the right of class certification to the concept of the private attorney general in cases where the clnss
representative's individual claim became moot or was otherwise resolved. Id. at 403. This analogy
was dictum, however, as the Court ruled that appellate courts may review denial of a class certificntion motion even though the proposed representative's claim has become moot. The representative
has standing to appeal because he has a "personal stake" in obtaining class certification within the
traditional meaning of that language.
374. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,258 (1972) (citing New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S.296 (1921); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.208 (1901);
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900)).
375. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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patriae suit to obtain injunctive relief against railroads allegedly violating
the antitrust laws. And, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. ,376the Court reaffirmed the parens patriae principle, though it refused to permit the state
as parens patriae to seek damages on behalf of its citizens.
But here too, the Court has explicitly denied states the use of parens
patriae suits to challenge federal government actions on constitutional
grounds. In Massachusetts v. Mellon,377the Court stated:
It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some circumstances,
may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens . . . it is no part
of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations
with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and
not the State, which represents them as parenspatriae, when such representation becomes appropriate . . . .378
One must remember, though, that Massachusetts v. Mellon and the cases
that followed it were decided by a Court that had not focused its attention on the concept of collective rights under the Constitution and the
implications of their existence. Moreover, Mellon itself seemed not to
question the existence of collective interests so much as it disputed
whether the state was the appropriate representative to enforce them in
this particular case.379 What is significant is that the parens patriae doctrine represents an additional judicial recognition of circumstances in
which collectively held rights may be vindicated by a litigant who cannot
show the type of individualized injury normally required by the Court to
confer standing.
The courts, therefore, have frequently given express or implied recognition to collectively held rights under the Constitution. Indeed, the
idea of collective rights is not only consistent with the United States'
constitutional and philosophical heritage, it is virtually compelled by it.
What the courts have never done, however, is to synthesize these concepts with the doctrine of standing so that the doctrine permits protection of such rights rather than functioning as a barrier to their assertion
and vitality. It is therefore necessary to develop a new theory of standing
that permits representation of collective rights without simultaneously
threatening to inundate the courts with suits that are frivolous, duplicative or both. The next Section addresses this problem.
376. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
377. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
378. Id. at 485-86 (citation omitted); see also Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,220 U.S.
277 (191 1) (parens patriae concept will not support original Supreme Court jurisdiction when the
state in fact seeks to represent citizens' interests but not its own). See generally Note, Standing of
States to Represent the Interests of Their Citizens in Federal Court, 21 AM. U.L. REV.224 (1971).
379. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485.
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C. Standing to Vindicate Collective Rights
As the law of standing exists today, collective interests in constitutional provisions cannot be effectively protected. Collective rights are
vindicated from time to time when they fortuitously appear in cases in
which a litigant can demonstrate individual standing, but there is no systematic way for these rights to receive their due. The difficulty with current standing theory lies in its restrictive view of the case-or-controversy
requirement. It is the Court, not the Constitution, that has defined a case
in terms of the plaintiffs stake in the outcome and further defined that
stake in terms of personal injury-in-fact. But as the Court itself has recognized, there exists a collective interest in government behavior constrained by constitutional limits-an interest the Court disparagingly
refers to as "generalized grievances."380 What the Court fails to realize is
that, in any society founded on the Lockean model, the citizens have an
enormous collective stake in the governmental trustee acting within its
powers and limitation^.^^' When government violates the Constitution,
society's interest is implicated, and that interest should be addressable in
the
Who is to represent the societal interest? Possible cases may be divided into two groups based on the constitutional provisions and governmental actions involved. In the first group, government actions violating
the Constitution necessarily produce an injury-in-fact traceable to a specific individual. For example, government suppression of speech in violation of the first amendment produces two types of injury. One is
collective; society's rights both to hear what the speaker would have
said383and to have government act according to the Constitution suffer
when government becomes censor. The second injury is to the would-be
speaker; his constitutional right to speak is impaired. This case presents
a situation where judicial vindication of an individual's rights and redress
of his injury a fortiori protects the public right simultaneously.384 Similarly, when the government conducts a search without probable cause or
380. See supra notes 137-41, 201-03 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 322-27 and accompanying text. In American society, three methods are
available to address government's constitutional violations: through the political process, through
the courts, and through exercise of the Lockean right of revolution. For most purposes, the first is
both impractical and inappropriate, see supra notes 312-21 and accompanying text, and the last is
impractical and undesirable. Locke himself made clear that the right of revolution is to be exercised
only in cases of the grossest government malfeasance. Seesupra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
The true alternatives, therefore, are acquiescence in constitutional violations or resort to the courts.
383. See supra notes 332-45 and accompanying text.
384. By contrast, if the individual chooses to acquiesce in the violation of his constitutional right
to speak, current standing doctrine leaves no one to protect the collective interest since the right to
receive information has not been accorded explicit first amendrncnt status by the Court. See, c.g.,
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584-89 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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a warrant in violation of the fourth amendment, the criminal defendant's
subsequent motion to suppress the fruits of the search also serves to invoke the judicial power to protect the collective privacy interest embodied in the fourth amendment.385 In a series of cases,386however, the
Court has ruled that though the government might have violated the
fourth amendment and though the defendant might have been directly
injured thereby, he is without standing to complain of the government's
illegal conduct. In such circumstances, the collective right cannot be
vindicated under current standing doctrine, despite the presence of an
individual injured in fact as a direct result of the constitutional violation.
The difficulty arises because the Court has silently substituted the legallyprotected-interest test for the injury-in-fact test of tan ding.^" It has created a subgroup of cases where collective rights could be vindicated by
individuals injured in fact, but where such individuals are refused standing either to represent the collective interest or to seek redress of the
injury-in-fact they have suffered as individuals.
In the second group of cases, a governmental constitutional violation cannot produce individualized injury-in-fact as that term has been
interpreted by the Court. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State,
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,3s9 United States v. R i c h a r d ~ o nand
, ~ ~Ex
~
parte Levitt 391 are examples of cases in this group. In these cases, it was
impossible for the plaintiffs to demonstrate any injury-in-fact attributable
to them individually; yet, if their allegations could have been proved, the
government would have been guilty of violating the Constitution. Nonetheless, in Valley Forge, Schlesinger, and Richardson, the Court recognized the possibility that no conceivable plaintiff would have standing.392
The two groups of cases suggest different tests for standing. Where
the government's unconstitutional act can give rise to individualized injury-in-fact, it seems appropriate to insist that the one who challenges the
action be one of those injured. But at the same time, the test of injury
should remain faithful to the injury-in-fact standard that the Court has
developed and should not retreat to the legally-protected-interest test
unanimously repudiated by the Court.393 Thus, in the fourth amend385. See supra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
388. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
389. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
390. 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
391. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam); see supra note 129.
392. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
393. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing S e n . Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); supra notes 214-26 and accompanying text.
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ment context, the use of illegally seized evidence would constitute injuryin-fact to the defendant. He would therefore qualify as a representative
of society's interest in privacy reflected in the fourth amendment. Similarly, a member of the public or a reporter who is excluded from the
courtroom is injured in fact and is the appropriate person to represent
the public's first amendment interest in open judicial proceedings. The
Supreme Court has recognized this sort of vicarious representation of the
public interest claimed by plaintiffs. As the court said in Sierra Club v.
Morton,394once a plaintiff has standing, he may argue the public interest
in support of his claim that the government has exceeded its lawful
authority.395
The second group of cases, where the unconstitutional government
action cannot result in injury-in-fact to an individual, poses a more difficult problem for standing purposes. The Court has declared that such
cases present "generalized grievances." Plaintiffs fail to present an article I11 case or controversy in these cases because their stake in the outcome is indistinguishable from that of anyone else.39GThe result is that
the collective right involved is left unprotected and unenforceable.
Therefore, I propose that individuals be accorded standing, much as private attorneys
to present constitutional challenges to unlawful
government action on behalf of the collective public interest. There can
be no question that the citizenry has a stake in the outcome of a constitutional case where the issue is whether the government has violated its
charter. The conflict between the collective interest in constitutionalism
on one hand and government's unlawful behavior on the other should be
found to meet the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 111. There
is, accordingly, no constitutional impediment to the concept of citizen
standing in the kind of case described here, provided that one does not
view all possible interests atomistically, each having no possible connection to the others.
Citizen standing as proposed here would, however, present two potential problems. First, if unregulated, it might open the doors of the
federal courthouses to a flood of constitutional litigation from persons
who would lack standing under current doctrine. Second, it raises the
possibility that the citizens who undertake to represent the public interest
may not be fit to do so. Both difficulties can be overcome through the use
--

394.
395.

--

405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Id. at 737 (footnote omitted) (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4
(1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940)).
396. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Churcli &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
397. See supra notes 367-73 and accompanying text.
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of a single device in citizen standing cases: the class action.398 Courts
have always determined the appropriateness of prospective class representatives in class actions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
both that the representative party assert a claim typical of the class399
and that he "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."400
-

- -

- -

398. The standing proposal advanced here requires no modification of the class action device
itself. Once the existence of judicially cognizable collective interests is recognized, established class
action principles permit appropriate invocation of the judicial power to protect such interests.
399. FED.R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). The claims of named plaintiffs are typical of the class' claims
when they are based on the same legal and remedial theories and when there is no adversity between
the named plaintiffs and unnamed class members. 7 C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER,FEDERAL
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
8 1764 (1972); see also Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465,
468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Clearly, when a single governmental act or pattern of acts is challenged as
unconstitutional, a citizen's claim will be typical; the constitutional theories asserted will be common
to all. It is possible, of course, that the class representative may not raise all of the possible constitutional objections to the challenged government activity. The failure of the representative and his
counsel to raise and vigorously to pursue all nonfrivolous constitutional arguments goes directly to
the representative's fitness to represent the class. See infra note 400. If the court feels that the
named class representative overlooks or rejects appropriate arguments, certification of the class
should be refused or, if already granted, should be withdrawn pursuant to FED.R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l).
"The district court may decertify a class after trial if plaintifs trial performance showed him or her
to be an inadequate class representative." Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. 673 F.2d 798, 81 1
(5th Cir. 1982) (citing Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 628 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980)), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 451 U.S. 902 (1981). It has been argued that the district court has an
affirmative duty to decertify a class where the representative is unsuitable. Sessum v. Houston Community College, 94 F.R.D. 316, 322 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796
(1st Cir. 1980)). But see Carpenter v. Steven F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 617-18 (5th Cir.
1983) (suggesting that after trial, a new class representative should be appointed in preference to
decertifying the class).
There is also no possibility of judicially cognizable adversity among the class members. It is, of
course, conceivable that some members of the citizen class might not wish the government to correct
its allegedly unconstitutional behavior. For example, supporters of Valley Forge Christian College
might applaud the land grant even if it violated thkfirst amendment. This would not make plaintiffs'
claims anv less reoresentative of the claims of the class. "Whether all the members desire to exercise
these rights is not relevant to the issues in the litigation. The possibility that some might not, at this
time, wish to exercise their right. . . does not preclude a class action." Cortright v. Resor, 325 F.
Supp. 797, 808 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S.965 (1972). Moreover, one would hesitate to assert that there is a judicially cognizable interest
in having government continue to violate the Constitution. Accordingly, though as a practical matter there may not be unanimity among members of the citizen class with respect to any particular
action, its absence does not undermine the propriety of the device.
Similarly, class members may have divergent views on whether the government's action is constitutional, wholly apart from their feelings on its desirability. Such a difference of opinion does not,
in this sort of public action any more than in any class action, constitute adversity among members
of the class. It is the function of the courts, not the class members, to decide the constitutional issue.
Indeed, to allow differences of opinion among class members to defeat the representativeness of the
named plaintiff would make it impossible for anyone to raise the constitutional challenge at all.
Thus, to allow diversity of opinion to preclude a public class action of the type advocated in this
Article would be to recognize a theory of constitutional relativism similar to that discussed supra in
notes 314-15 and accompanying text. In this case, however, diversity of public opinion would be the
cause of the judiciary's decision not to resolve the controversy rather than a r&ult of judicial
abstention.
400. FED.R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Courts generally focus on two factual questions in determining
whether the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interest of absent class members:
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The federal courts certainly have not been reluctant to refuse to certify
classes where the representative or counsel has been found to be inadequate.*' When the plaintiff asserts citizen standing, and therefore purports to represent the public interest, this inquiry will be crucial.
The threat of multiple actions dealing with identical constitutional
issues can also be met by the class action device. The federal courts
should establish a nationwide central indexing system to catalog ongoing
class actions invoking the collective-right, citizen-standing principles discussed here. Once a citizen class is certified,402all other district courts
should refuse to entertain similar suits since the plaintiffs before them
would already be parties in another case presenting the same question.
Duplicative actions can be stayed, enjoined, or dismissed.403In this manner, only one citizen-standing challenge to a particular governmental action could be maintained. It is precisely this sort of economy of judicial
and litigative effort that the class action was in part designed to
achieve.404 Appropriate use of the class action device, therefore, suggests
a solution to the two practical problems associated with the proposal for
citizen standing in constitutional cases suggested here.405
Therefore, both the conceptual structure and an appropriate procewhether the named plaintiffs can present a strong case on behalf of the entire class, Mack v. General
Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and whether the attorneys representing the class will
vigorously pursue the action. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Counsel must be qualified, experienced and adequate to conduct the litigation.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555,562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156
(1974). The litigants must not be involved in collusive litigation, nor may named plaintiffs have
interests antagonistic to those of the rest of the class. The named plaintiffs' interests must be coextensive with those of the remainder of the class. Id.; Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Finally, the court must be satisfied that the named plaintiffs will protect the duc
process rights of absent class members. Eisen, 391 F.2d at 562.
401. See, e.g., Green v. Carlson, 653 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiarn), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 944 (1982); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 88 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. 111. 1980); Tomkin v.
Kaysen, 69 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
402. "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, thc
Eourt shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." FED.R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l).
403. The mere pendency of a class action does not preclude parallel individual actions by class
PRACTICE 23.92 (2d ed. 1984).
members. 3B J. MOORE& J. KENNEDY,MOORE'SFEDERAL
Nevertheless, "a court having in personam jurisdiction over a class suit [under Rule 23(b)(l) or
(b)(2)] should have the power to enjoin competing actions that are vexatious and oppressive." Id.
(footnote omitted). For the government to have to litigate the same constitutional question repeatedly is oppressive, hence sound policy dictates the availability of injunctive relief.
Moreover, if a central index of citizen standing cases were established, all other courts would be
able to stay duplicative suits pending judgment in the class action, thus avoiding judicial inefficiency.
See, eg., Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 692 F.2d 102, 106 (10th Cir. 1982); Leisner v. New York
Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
494. See Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968); Kainz v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952).
405. The other requirements of Rule 23 are easily satisfied by any case of the type described
here. When the citizenry is the plaintiff class, the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(l) is satisfied. In addition, the constitutionality of a government action is a question common to the class, as

n
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dural device exist to permit recognition of a new type of standing in certain constitutional cases. The availability of citizen standing would have
changed the results in some, but not all, of the standing cases from the
1 9 7 0 ' ~ .Sierra
~ ~ Club v. Mortonm7 provides an interesting example of
how the limited citizen-standing theory would work. If one regards dimrequired by Rule 23(a)(2). The other two criteria of Rule 23(a) have already been discussed. See
supra notes 399-401 and accompanying text.
With regard to Rule 23@), citizen-standing actions would be maintainable under subsections
(l)(A), (l)(B) or (2). With respect to Rule 23(b)(l)(A), separate individual actions against a single
government action or policy alleged to be unconstitutional could certainly result in inconsistent
judicial interpretations establishing wholly incompatible standards of conduct for the government.
Moreover, judgments in individual cases would have stare decisis value for future litigation and thus,
within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(l)@), would tend to conclude the interests of other individuals not
party to the action.
As for Rule 23@)(2), an unconstitutional government act or policy that by its nature is incapable of producing individuated injury-in-fact, see supra notes 388-92, 396-97 and accompanying text,
clearly constitutes an act generally applicable to the citizen class. In such cases, injunctive or declaratory relief is, as a practical matter, the only appropriate remedy. The courts have interpreted the
rule to require that "the party opposing the class has acted either in a consistent manner toward
or has established a regulatory scheme common to all class members." 7A
members of the class.
C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER,supra note 399, 8 1775, at 19-20 (footnote omitted). Thus, Rule 23@)(2)
is the section best designed for management of the type of class action proposed here.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has restricted the use of the class action device to some
extent. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), the Court held that in a diversity
case, each member of the class (named or unnamed) must satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 0982). Thus, the plaintiffs' claims may not be aggregated to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement. Accordingly, Zahn makes it more difficult for persons with
small individual claims to pursue them as a class in the federal courts.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Court ruled that each class member
whose name and address was readily ascertainable had to be individually notified of the action's
pendency pursuant to FED.R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2). The Court also held that the proponent of the class
was required to bear the entire cost of the notification. Eisen thus erects some substantial barriers to
individuals' ability to undertake class action litigation.
Finally, Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), sharply restricted the appealability of orders denying class certification, finding them inappropriate bases for interlocutory appeals.
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that denial of certification might well be the death knell
of such litigation because the individual plaintiff would find it uneconomical to pursue litigation in
the absence of class certification. Id. at 469-71. Nonetheless, the Court declined to permit interlocutory appeals despite the potential "incremental benefit" in situations where litigation would be ended
by denial of class action certification. Id. at 473.
The factor which unites these cases and distinguishes them from the type of public action proposed here is that they are all actions brought pursuant to FED.R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Such actions are
characterized by the separable individual interests of the class members; typically such actions seek
money damages which may vary according to the individual's involvement in the controversy. I t is
for this reason that the Court has strictly interpreted the requirement of FED.R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)
that individual notice be given to each member of the @)(3) class if practicable. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The public actions supported by this Article, however, would be
certified under FED.R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l) or (b)(2) and by definition do not involve injuries differentiable according to class member. Hence, there is no individualized interest allocable to absent class
members. Recent Supreme Court cases simply do not address such actions.
406. See supra Part 11, Section A.
407. 405 U.S.727 (1972); see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.

..
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inution of one's enjoyment of the environment as an i n j ~ r y - i n - f a c t , ~ ~ ~
then the result of Sierra Club would not change. Because individualized
injury-in-fact would be possible, citizen standing would not be
available.409
On the other hand, both United States v. Richardson410 and
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 41' would be decided
differently under a doctrine of citizen standing. In Richardson, the Court
denied standing precisely because the plaintiff had failed to allege an interest distinguishable from that of the public generally,412a finding
echoed by the Schlesinger majority.413 The concept of citizen standing
urged here would seize upon that generalized public interest as a reason
to find standing, not a reason to deny it. Without recognition of such a
collective right to lawful government behavior, and standing to insist
upon it, some provisions of the Constitution are unenforceable, deadletter law. Similarly, the result in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, IncS4l4would be
different. A broader standing doctrine, recognizing a collective "right to
a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has
violated by acting differently,'y415would make the alleged constitutional
abuse in Valley Forge subject to judicial review, precisely in order to vindicate society's generalized, but nonetheless fundamental, interest in government behavior consistent with its trust.
Finally, there remains the question of the nexus requirement. To
the extent that it reflects the idea that the governmental action must not
only harm the plaintiff, but must also violate some duty owed to himY4l6
then the recognition of the government's duty to act constitutionally as a
duty owed to all citizens would satisfy the nexus requirement. That duty
is breached whenever government violates the Constitution, and the
nexus requirement is automatically satisfied under the collective-right
citizen-standing proposal advanced here. To the extent that the nexus
requirement is, in Professor Tribe's words, "an attempt to reduce the risk
408. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); seesupra notes 238-42 and accompany-

ing text.
409. If, however, the Supreme Court were to reverse its view of environmental damage cxpressed in SCRAP, declaring it insufficient to give rise to individual injury-in-fact, then invocation of
the citizen-standing doctrine would be appropriate. In that case, the result of Sierra Club would be
reversed by the new standing concept.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

418
418

U.S. 166 (1974).
U.S. 208 (1974).

See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
454 U.S. 464 (1982); see supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S.at 483.
See Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV.
L. REV.633, 636 (1971). See generally L. TRIDE,
supra note 8, 5 3-22, at 98.
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that federal judges will unintentionally divert the central thrust of constitutional and statutory policies by allowing 'officious intermeddlers' to invoke federal claims under provisions designed to benefit persons who
then the requiremay be entirely satisfied with the action ~hallenged,"~~'
ment is unnecessary under this new concept of standing. If the "intermeddler" can show injury-in-fact, then he should be entitled to invoke
the judicial power. If he cannot make such a showing, then he is without
standing unless no one else could suffer injury-in-fact either. The fact
that some citizens may be satisfied with or unperturbed by the government action should not be a bar to standing; no one has the right to enjoy
the perceived benefits of illegal government action.
In short, the nexus requirement diverts attention from the public's
collective interest in having its government operate with the consent of
the governed. On a day-to-day basis, that consent is manifest in the Constitution, statutes, and other regulations-the rules for conduct of government. Perhaps that is why the Court so sharply restricted the nexus
requirement in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc. ,418 declaring its inapplicability except in taxpayer suits.419Professor
Tribe has suggested that even in taxpayer suits the requirement be abandoned because it is "misguided," "unnecessary," and " ~ n w a r r a n t e d . " ~ ~ ~
This Article supports that suggestion, but for an additional reason. Taxpayer standing was suggested, though repudiated, in Frothingham v.
Mellon 421 and later adopted in Flast v. Cohen 422 to deal with a class of
cases in which there could be no injury-in-fact under traditional doctrine.
Citizen standing as suggested here, with appropriate recognition of the
collective rights under the Constitution, would render taxpayer standing
superfluous. Moreover, because the nexus requirement invariably operates, when applied, to foreclose standing in cases in which the collective
interest of society clearly calls for the availability of judicial intervention,
it is inconsistent with our Lockean foundation. The nexus requirement
must be abandoned because it forecloses needed judicial review, not
merely because, as Professor Tribe
it functions poorly as an
empirical matter.

This Article has proposed a bifurcated standing doctrine in constitutional cases. In cases in which the challenged governmental action can
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

L. TRIBE,
supra note 8, 8 3-22, at 99.
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Id. at 78-79; see supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
L. TRIBE,
supra note 8, at Supp. 12 (1979).
262 U.S. 447, 486-88 (1923).
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
See L. TRIBE,
supra note 8, §§ 3-26, 3-27.
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cause individualized injury-in-fact, the collective interest in lawful government behavior is sufficiently protected if enforcement is left to the
individuals directly suffering the harm. But in cases where the assertedly
unlawful action cannot give rise to individual injury, the collective interest can only be adequately protected if individuals are given standing to
represent the public interest. The public, the collective body, has a stake
in the outcome whenever the issue is whether government has violated its
charter. Each person in our society is one of the settlors and beneficiaries
of the trust which is civil government under the Lockean model. When
the trustee violates the trust, each person is aggrieved. A standing doctrine consistent with the political philosophy so important to our constitutional system cannot fail to permit judicial challenge when the trust is
broken.
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